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ABSTRACT
This first part of this article examines the citation of American academic law
journals in reported opinions from all U.S. state and federal courts from 1945-2018.
The study shows a steady rise in the proportion of reported cases that cite at least
one academic legal periodical from 1.8% in 1945 to a peak of 4.9%, first in 1967, and
again in 1974 and 1975. Citation rates decreased from thereon, falling to a low of
1.5% of reported cases from 2005-2010 before rebounding slightly in recent years.
Part II of this article compares judicial citations from 1970-2018 for articles
published in Harvard Law Review and Yale Law Journal, the two longest running
student-edited journals 1 at arguably the two most elite law schools in the United
States, 2 with articles published in flagship journals for each of the four "tiers" from
the U.S. News & World Reports "Best Law Schools" rankings, and three exemplar
schools from the "Top 14."
This study shows that as the percentage of reported cases citing to at least one
academic law journal article has decreased since the mid-1970s, so too has the
proportion of reported cases citing to the leading journals of the elite law schools
included in this study. At the same time, citation rates for law reviews of exemplar
schools for Tiers I-IV remained relatively stable throughout. This paper attempts to
explore and explain these trends in the context of changes in technology, the
judiciary, legal scholarship, and academic legal publishing.
INTRODUCTION
It has been nearly ten years since Chief Justice Roberts’s now famous quip at the
expense of law reviews:

Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early Development of
Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739, 779 (1985).
2 See Patrick J. Glen, Harvard and Yale Ascendant: The Legal Education of the Justices from Holmes
to Kagan, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 129, 139–44 (2010) (exploring potential explanations for the
confirmation of Harvard and Yale graduates, exclusively, for positions on the United States Supreme
Court since 1986, and predicting that "the dominance of these two schools will most likely continue
into the future, even if it is not quite as pronounced as it is in the present").
1

"Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is
likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary
approaches in Eighteenth Century Bulgaria or something, which I'm
sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn't of much
help to the bar." 3
While Chief Justice Roberts was hardly the first member of the judiciary to question
the utility of law reviews, 4 his stature stoked further discussion in a debate over
their value that is as old as academic law reviews themselves. 5 The Chief Justice's
comments also coincided with the end of the five-year-long nadir for judicial citation
of academic legal periodicals in this study, with the proportion of all reported
opinions citing to law reviews having fallen steadily since their peak in the mid1970s.
In addition to the overall proportion of opinions citing to academic law journals, this
article examines the proportion of cases citing to the two longest running studentedited academic legal periodicals, Harvard Law Review and Yale Law Journal with
three exemplar schools from the "Top 14," and each of the four "tiers" of the U.S.
News & World Reports "Best Law Schools" rankings. The findings in this study
suggest that the citation advantage enjoyed by Harvard, Yale, and other "elite" law
schools has also decreased since the 1970s while citation rates to journals from law
schools in Tiers I-IV of the rankings have remained consistent.
This article will begin with a brief look at the history of student-edited law reviews
in the United States and how their initially cool reception gradually gave way to
acceptance by the judiciary. This study begins in 1945 and explores the gradual
increase in the proportion of opinions citing law reviews that would reach its zenith
in the 1960s and 70s, followed by a steady decline thereafter. I believe this trend
can be explained, in large part, by an increase in both judicial caseload and the
number of opinions, changes in technology that facilitated research and access to
those opinions, and changes in scholarship that made law reviews seem less
relevant to the bench and bar.

John Roberts, A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts, C-SPAN (June 25, 2011), https://www.cspan.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts (30:42–32:14). In addition to stirring
debate, Chief Justice Roberts's remarks prompted publication of a tongue in cheek article about his
hypothetical topic: Orin S. Kerr, The Influence of Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in
Eighteenth Century Bulgaria, 18 THE GREEN BAG 2D 251 (2015).
4 See, e.g., infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
5 See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 764–66 (quoting The Albany Law School Journal, 3 CENT.
L.J. 136 (1876)) (noting the cool reception received by the first student-edited legal periodical at the
hands of commercial journal editorial boards: "'The boys at the Albany Law School have had the
enterprise to start a new journal,' wrote the Central Law Journal on February 25, 1876, adding,
'Altogether it is quite creditable. Of course it is not a man's journal.'").
3

Part II of this article begins by comparing citations to flagship journals from
Harvard and Yale with those of other law schools representing the "Top 14" and
each of the four tiers of the U.S. News Rankings. The data shows a significant
decline in citation to the elite law schools’ law reviews since the 1970s, but a
persistent bias in favor of these journals remains. The article explores these
changes in citation frequency in the context of continued elitism in the legal
profession and amid changes in technology and legal publishing that have narrowed
these discrepancies.
PART I: CITATION OF ACADEMIC LAW REVIEWS BY THE JUDICIARY
EARLY LAW REVIEWS
By the late Nineteenth Century, legal periodicals had become an important part of
American legal publishing, allowing lawyers to monitor recent opinions and keep
abreast of changes in the law. 6 Until the launch of the Albany Law School Journal
in 1875, these efforts were entirely in the hands of professional editors. 7 This
journal, and another started by law students at Columbia were short-lived, but they
laid the groundwork for students at Harvard Law School to follow in their footsteps
by founding the Harvard Law Review in 1887. 8 Four years later, their peers in New
Haven launched the Yale Law Journal, followed by the establishment of law
reviews at Pennsylvania, Columbia, and Michigan. 9 Perhaps not coincidentally,

Roger C. Cramton, The Most Remarkable Institution: The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
1, 2 (1986). See also Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 751–63 (describing the development of
commercial legal periodicals in the United States) and FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND
METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 215 (3d ed. 1942) (quoting Charles E. Grinnell, General Notes, 15 AM.
L. REV. 806 (1881)) ("By 1881, writers began to speak of our periodical law press as 'now fast
developing into a valuable substitute for a national system of law.'").
7 See Michael I. Swygert, Imitating the 'Boys' of Albany: The Birth of the Valparaiso University Law
Review, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 157, 158–60 (1991) (discussing responses to the early student-edited
journals at Albany and Columbia); see also HICKS, supra note 6, at 207 (listing publication date
ranges for early law school periodicals). For a description of a surviving issue of the Albany Law
School Journal, see Robert A. Emery, The Albany Law School Journal: The Only Surviving Copy, 89
L. LIBR. J. 463, 464-65 (1997) (noting its content more closely resembles a student newspaper than
an academic law review).
8 Cramton, supra note 6, at 3–4; see also Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 768–69 ("Although there
is no evidence that [the] Harvard editors were aware of the earliest student-edited periodical, the
Albany Law School Journal, they certainly were familiar with the Columbia Jurist . . . [and their]
knowledge of the Columbia students' venture in legal journalism surely contributed to the overall
concept of the Harvard publication.").
9 Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 782–84 (noting also that law reviews at both Michigan and
Northwestern were initially edited by faculty).
6

these longest-running academic journals are associated with many of today’s elite
law schools. 10
FIRST CITATIONS IN CASE LAW
While law reviews may have found avid readership among their alumni and utility
to members of the profession, 11 judicial citation of journals was exceedingly rare
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 12 The earliest instance of
a substantive citation to a legal periodical, rather than simply citing a case reported
in a journal, came from an 1857 Supreme Court of Indiana case. 13 In reaching their
conclusion that a municipality had authority to purchase stocks in a railroad that
ran through the city, the Court cited to the lead article from an 1854 issue of the
American Law Register that argued in favor of state sovereignty over its navigable
waterways, and in turn, the delegation of that legislative authority to its
municipalities. 14
Since the American Law Register was professionally edited at the time, not being
published by the University of Pennsylvania Law School until 1896, 15 I investigated
further and found what I believe to be the first citation to a student-edited legal
periodical in American case law, an 1890 North Carolina Supreme Court opinion in
which the judge refers to a Harvard Law Review article by Christopher Columbus

See, e.g., 2021 Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, https://www.usnews.com/bestgraduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (last visited July 7, 2020) (each of these law schools
falls within the "Top 10" of the most recent rankings) and Lowell J. Noteboom & Timothy B. Walker,
The Law Review—Is It Meeting the Needs of the Legal Profession?, 44 DENV. L.J. 426, 447 (1967)
("[T]he law reviews at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Pennsylvania, etc. have been around for a long time,
and they are associated with law schools that established themselves early as excellent institutions
in the field of legal education. It is primarily because they were the first in the field to do a good job
(or any job at all) that they initially rose to positions of leadership.").
11 See e.g., Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 773 (noting the first issue of the Harvard Law Review
had around 300 subscribers, and that by 1890, the Harvard Law Association began purchasing
copies for all of its members). By the turn of the century, heavy demand for early copies of the
Review necessitated an extensive reprinting effort. Id. at 779 (citing 15 HARV. L. REV. 219 (1901)).
12 See Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 773, 811 (finding percentage of state supreme courts citing to law reviews remained between
0.3 and 0.5 percent from 1870 through 1925).
13 City of Aurora v. West and Another, 9 Ind. 74, 1857 Ind. LEXIS 482 (1857).
14 Id. at 82 (citing Are State Bridges Constitutional?, 3 AMER. L. REGISTER 1 (1854)). The article was
not quoted in the opinion, but states, "if Pennsylvania cannot affect the destination of the Schuylkill,
because goods are carried on it to other states, a fortiori it cannot control the employment of the
streets of Philadelphia . . . over which a commerce to other States of immensely greater value, daily
passes; nor can it authorize the city corporation to make municipal regulations for that purpose . . . If
the argument be correct, indeed, nothing is left in the states to legislate over." Id. at 24.
15 Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 756. The American Law Register, was renamed the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review in 1896, and has the distinction of being "the oldest continually published
legal periodical in America." Id. at 781.
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Langdell to explain a concept that was "so familiar . . . [it was] hardly necessary to
illustrate [it] by reference to actual cases." 16
The U.S. Supreme Court, meanwhile, would not cite to a student-edited journal
until Justice Edward White's dissent in an 1897 contracts case, United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 17 followed three years later by the Court’s first law
review citation in a majority opinion. 18 Even then, law reviews were not widely
accepted, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes would dismiss them as the "work of
boys" a decade later, when an attorney referred to them during oral argument. 19 As
late as the 1920s, Chief Justice William Howard Taft "chided his colleagues
(principally Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone) for the 'undignified' use of law review
material in their dissents." 20
ACCEPTANCE AND APPROBATION
By then however, the sentiments of the judiciary had already begun to change, led
by luminaries like Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, and Judge Learned Hand, 21
16 Hancock et al. v. Wooten et al., 12 S.E. 199, 201, 107 N.C. 9, 20 (1890) (citing C.C. Langdell, A
Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction: Creditors' Bills, 3 HARV. L. REV. 99 (1890)) ("Bills of this kind are
called 'Judgment Creditors' Bills' (see Harvard Law Review, October 1890), and are so familiar in
our practice that it is hardly necessary to illustrate them by reference to actual cases.").
17 Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 788 (citing U.S. v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290, 350
n.1 (1897)).
18 Michael L. Closen & Robert J. Dzielak, The History of the Law Review Institution, 30 AKRON L.
REV. 15, 26 (1996) (citing Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 178 U.S. 353, 365 (1900)). In a
unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Melville Fuller cited a discussion on partial payment in
satisfaction of a debt appearing in an 1899 Harvard Law Review article. Id. (citing James Barr
Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HARV. L. REV. 515, 521 (1899)).
19 Charles E. Hughes, Foreword, 50 YALE L.J. 737, 737 (1941). Interestingly, despite his later
criticism, Holmes authored the lead articles in two issues of the Harvard Law Review several years
prior: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1891) and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894); see also Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law
Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 9–
10, 15 (1983) (finding only one citation to a law review during the October 1900 Supreme Court Term
and concluding, "it obviously was not considered acceptable for Supreme Court Justices to refer to
[legal periodicals] at the turn of the century.").
20 JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE DIMENSIONS OF NON-LEGAL EVIDENCE IN THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS
133 (1990) (quoting ALPHEUS T. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 268-69 (1965)). See also Chester A.
Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 479 (1959)
(in a study of Supreme Court opinions from the October Term of 1924 through the October Term of
1956, Chief Justice Taft cited a legal periodical only once, and Justice Holmes only twice; Brandeis,
and Stone were both more apt to cite law reviews, citing them 19 and 21 times, respectively, during
that period).
21 See id.; see also Douglas B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to
the Development of the Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 186 n.11a (1930) (quoting Circuit Judge Learned
Hand, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, and Chief
Justice Robert von Moschzisker of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the usefulness of law reviews
in the performance of their judicial duties and their willingness to cite them in their opinions) and

although the proportion of opinions citing to law reviews around this time still
remained well below their lowest point in this study. 22 In 1941, Taft's successor,
Chief Justice Charles Hughes, struck a far more positive tone in a foreword
composed in honor of the 50th Anniversary of the Yale Law Journal, where he
described law reviews as the "fourth estate of the law" and said, "[i]t is not too much
to say that, in confronting any serious problem, a wide-awake and careful judge will
at once look to see if that subject has been discussed, or the authorities collated and
analyzed, in a good legal periodical." 23
METHODOLOGY
To determine the total number of opinions in Lexis for a given year, I ran a search
for that year in Lexis Advance's "Cases" database and restricted my results by date
to that year alone. For example, by searching ("1972") & DA(aft 12-31-1971 & bef
01-01-1973), and selecting "Publication Status" from the menu on the left, I found
59,320 reported opinions for 1972. I could then add the reported and unreported
numbers together to determine the total number of opinions in Lexis for that year,
in this case 60,758; however, I assumed researchers would be most interested in
seeing how journals were cited in reported opinions, so I focused my data gathering
efforts on those results. 24
In the interests of readability, the searching and data compilation methodologies I
employed for Part I are included as Appendix A. That section recounts my attempt

Frederick E. Crane, Law School Reviews and the Courts, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 3 (1935) (Chief Judge
Crane of the New York Court of Appeals wrote in a symposium piece for Fordham Law Review, "[law
reviews have] supplemented the textbook and the decision because we have found from experience
that the modern law professor . . . has had time as well as desire to enter thoroughly into the study
of a particular subject and has given the result of his efforts for the benefit of the profession . . . we of
the bench, as well as the lawyer at the bar, should make this acknowledgement, though somewhat
belated, of the help which we get from [law reviews] in the disposition of the every-day work of the
courts.").
22 Douglas B. Maggs, supra note 21, at 191–94 (examining federal and state reported opinions from a
roughly one year period in the late 1920s and U.S. Supreme Court opinions from 1924-1928, and
finding only 80 opinions out of an estimated total of 30,000 [0.27%], and 61 out of approximately 850
judges citing law reviews.) Another study of state supreme courts found the percentage of opinions
citing to law reviews remained between 0.3% and 0.5% between 1870-1925 before increasing to 2.3%
from 1930-40, 3.8% from 1945-55, and finally 11.9% from 1960-70, with the "innovative" supreme
courts from New Jersey and California leading the way. Friedman et al., supra note 12 at 811, 815.
23 Hughes, supra note 19, at 737. This change at the U.S. Supreme Court was initially led by Justice
Louis Brandeis, and solidified by the nine Justices appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Closen & Dzielak, supra note 18 at 27 (citing PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE
PEOPLE 364 (1984)).
24 See David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of
Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1353–54. ("Reported decisions are
documents evidencing the law, and thus citation to legal scholarship in reported decisions brings
cited scholarship into close relationship with the law.").

to include all academic journals listed in the Current Index to Legal Periodicals, 25
the Index to Legal Periodicals Retrospective: 1908-1981 Coverage List, 26 and the 19th
edition of The Bluebook. 27
A RISING TIDE
During the first year of my study in 1945, academic law reviews were still only cited
in roughly 1.8% of opinions, but the period following World War II would usher in
an era of growth, both in their numbers 28 and in their citation by the judiciary, as
this "remarkable institution" 29 "earned the real respect of the bench." 30 By the early
1960s, the proportion of cases citing law reviews had increased to nearly four
percent of reported opinions. Judge Roger Traynor said at that time, "There is in no
other profession and in no other country anything equal to the student-edited
American law review," describing law reviews as "the best critics a judge could
have." 31
The ensuing years, from 1963 through 1980, witnessed a high-water mark in the
judicial citation of academic law reviews in this study, with the proportion of
opinions citing journals never falling below 4%, and reaching as high as 4.9% in
1967, 1974, and 1975. This peak represents a 172% increase in opinions citing law
reviews since 1945.
The years following the 1975 peak witnessed a slow and steady decline in the
proportion of opinions citing to law reviews in my study as citations fell below 4% by
1981, below 3% in 1987, and below 2% in 1994, falling to their lowest proportion in
CILP Journals, HEINONLINE, https://libguides.heinonline.org/c.php?g=1045270&p=7595542
[https://perma.cc/V2B3-T2FA] (last visited July 6, 2020).
26 Index to Legal Periodicals Retrospective: 1908-1981 (H.W. Wilson)
Database Coverage List, EBSCO, https://www.ebscohost.com/titleLists/lpr-coverage.htm
[https://www.ebscohost.com/titleLists/lpr-coverage.htm] (last visited July 6, 2020).
27 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed.
2010). This was the last edition to include a list of periodicals by title in Table 13.
28 Barbara H. Cane, The Role of Law Reviews in Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 215, 220 (1981)
(noting an increase in the number of law reviews from 44 in 1941 to 78 in 1955, 102 in 1966, and 182
in 1979).
29 Earl Warren, Messages of Greeting to the U.C.L.A. Law Review, 1 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1953).
30 Stanley H. Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 918 (1953) ("We admire
the law review for its scholarship, its accuracy, and, above all, for its excruciating fairness. We are
well aware that the review takes very seriously its role as judge of judges—and to that, we say, more
power to you.").
31 Roger J. Traynor, To the Right Honorable Law Reviews, 10 UCLA L. REV. 3, 8-–10 (1962); see also
William O. Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227 (1965) (in an address
delivered to members of the Washington Law Review, Justice Douglas relayed his "special affection
for law reviews . . . [noting he has] drawn heavily from them for ideas and guidance as practitioner,
as teacher, and as judge") and Noteboom & Walker, supra note 10, at 433 (noting that 62.7% of
judges who responded to a 1966 survey found law reviews "quite valuable" for their research versus
16.7% who felt they had "little or no value").
25

2009, at 1.47%. This figure represents a 70% decrease from the mid-1970s. The
proportion of opinions citing to law reviews has risen slightly since, however,
coming back full circle to reach 1.8% in 2018, the same percentage as in 1945, the
first year of this study. Other studies have shown similar patterns in judicial
citation of legal scholarship at different points during this time period. 32

See, e.g., Friedman et al., supra note 12 at 811; John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations:
An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and
1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 405 (1978) (noting an increase in citations to legal periodicals by the
California Supreme Court from 87 in 1950 to 164 in 1970); Michael D. McClintock, The Declining
Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998) (in a study of
citations to 40 leading law reviews by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal circuit courts, federal district
courts, and state supreme courts, the author found quantitative decreases of 58.6%, 56.0%, 24.8%,
and 46.8%, respectively, between the years 1975-1976 and 1995-1996); Louis J. Sirico Jr., The Citing
of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971-1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009, 1011–13 (2000) (finding "a
steady decline" in both the number and proportion of opinions citing to legal scholarship over four
different two-year Supreme Court terms between 1971 and 1998); and Blake Rohrbacher, Decline:
Twenty-Five Years of Student Scholarship in Judicial Opinions, 80 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 553 (2006)
("Judicial citation of student notes has plunged since 1980."). Cf. Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra
note 12, at 1363 (authors noted a steady increase in the proportion of opinions citing to legal
scholarship from 1950, reaching a high point in in the late 1970s through the early to mid-1980s,
followed by a steady decrease through the remainder of the decade before the proportion leveled out
around 1990 and "[held] steady at a rate substantially higher than in the earlier years studied.").
But see Whit D. Pierce & Anne E. Reuben, Empirical Study, The Law Review is Dead; Long Live the
Law Review: A Closer Look at the Declining Use of Legal Scholarship, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185,
1203, 1221–25 (2010) (in a study limited to federal and state court opinions that included headnotes
on Westlaw, two Wake Forest law students found proportional increases in the judicial citation of
law reviews between the years 1960-1964 and 2005-2009, finding the largest increase among U.S.
Supreme Court opinions, from 12.9% to 31.4%).
32

The overall quantity of opinions citing to law reviews also increased from the
beginning of this study, ultimately reaching its peak of 4,226 in 1983, somewhat
later than the proportional peak because the number of reported opinions over that
time—115,192 for 1983 versus 71,112 in 1975—outpaced the growth of citations,
meaning that the proportion had decreased by 1983 to 3.7%. As with the
proportional percentage, the quantity of opinions citing to law reviews also declined
fairly consistently after its peak over the ensuing decades. 33

THE TIDE EBBS
There are several potential explanations for why, after years of growing acceptance
and utilization as a source of reference for the courts, law reviews began to fall out
of favor. These factors include changes in technology, increases in caseload and case
law, and a shift in the legal academy led by the elite law schools that pushed the
boundaries of scholarship beyond the scope of matters typically litigated in the
courts.
TECHNOLOGY
From the 1940s through the 1980s, researchers hoping to find law review articles on
a particular topic would typically need to consult a periodical index such as Index to
See Figure __, "Number of Reported Opinions Citing Law Reviews"; see also McClintock, supra
note 32, at 689 (showing a decline in citations to 40 leading law reviews by all federal courts and
state supreme courts from 7,131 in 1975-76 to 6,835 in 1985-86, and finally, 4,108 in 1995-96).
33

Legal Periodicals before pulling a physical journal volume from the shelf. 34 This
process began to change in 1982, when Lexis and Westlaw added the text of select
law reviews to their searchable databases; 35 however, the inclusion of additional
titles was a gradual process, 36 and researchers relied primarily on indexes into the
1990s. 37
At the same time, the ease of locating caselaw through Lexis and Westlaw,
introduced in 1973 and 1975, respectively, likely had an ever-greater impact on the
decline of journal citation of law reviews as these now ubiquitous databases became
increasingly relied upon by the legal profession. 38 By facilitating the discovery of
primary law, these services provided researchers with a viable, and in many ways

See FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 336–37 (3d ed. 1942); see
also J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 314 (1977)
("[T]he usefulness of legal periodicals depends almost entirely on the ability to find out what articles
have been written and where they have been published. Generally, it is necessary to rely to indexes
to the legal periodical literature for this purpose.").
35 Howard A. Hood, Disk and Dat: Recent Developments in Legal Databases and Emerging
Information Technologies in the United States, 15 INT'L J. L. INFO. 109, 112 (1987) ("LEXIS has
added all articles from over thirty journals beginning with their 1982 volume. WESTLAW has
selected articles from many more journals for the same period . . . [although] [b]ecause of the
selectivity of the WESTLAW database, one cannot be sure whether a particular article will be
available through that service. (West has recently decided to match [Lexis] in loading all articles
from the top legal journals.)").
36 By the late 1980s, Lexis provided full-text searching of roughly 48 mostly academic law reviews it
considered "important," while Westlaw provided access to a broader range of journals, although some
with coverage of individual articles only, selected for their importance to legal practice. MORRIS L.
COHEN ET AL., HOW TO FIND THE LAW 376–77 (9th ed. 1989); see also Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last
Writes—Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 657–58 (1996)
(explaining the reasons for the initial exclusion of law reviews, and beginning in 1982, the gradual
inclusion of full-text journals into the databases).
37 See Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 926, 937 (1990) ("Finding everything that's ever been written on [a] subject requires little more
than leafing through the Current Law Index or its older but perfectly adequate counterpart, the
Index to Legal Periodicals.") By the mid-1990s this seems to have changed. See Hibbitts, supra note
36, at 658–59 ("Together, LEXIS and WESTLAW have subtly changed the way in which law review
material is distributed, accessed, and employed by many members of the American legal
community.").
38 See William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77 LAW LIBR. J.
543, 547–53 (1985) (discussing the Ohio Bar Association's attempt to create an "on-line" legal
research service that would eventually evolve into Lexis, and the West Publishing Company's
subsequent development of Westlaw in response); see also Peter Nycum, Law and Computers:
Overview Update 1975, 68 LAW LIBR. J. 234, 247–49 (reviewing databases available, and expected to
be made available, to Lexis subscribers by the end of 1975; Lexis offered two subscription plans for
access to a single terminal, a $36,000 per year plan that provided between 28 and 55 hours of
research per month, and a second option for $18,000 per year that provided 9–18 hours of search
time per month). At the time the article was published, the West Retrieval System, which would
begin by offering electronic access to West's General Digest, Fourth Series, was still in testing. Id. at
250.
34

superior alternative to using law reviews as a shortcut for their own research. 39
They also gave judges more opportunity to locate and cite controlling precedent in
their opinions in lieu of nonbinding secondary sources like legal periodicals. 40
This greater discoverability of information applied to nonlegal material as well. 41
The ease and ubiquity of online searching since the 1990s facilitated the discovery
and citation of online sources by both judges and attorneys with multiple studies
showing an increase in citation to various nonlegal materials by the courts, 42
continuing a trend that began even before the advent of the Internet. 43 Additionally,
the consolidation of the legal publishing industry into a few large multinational
conglomerates has made nonlegal sources more visible to legal researchers as
Pierce & Reuben, supra note 32, at 1194 ("[W]ith the emergence of the Internet, judges and their
clerks have easy, instant access to reams of caselaw. It used to be that law reviews serve as an easy
research tool for judges. A judge before he or she wrote an opinion, would use a law review to do just
that—review the law. With the advent of the Internet, it makes sense for a judge to cut the
middleman out of the research process."); see also, Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic
Legal Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 319 (1989) (Judge Kaye notes reading law reviews for
background information in relation to the issues she faces on the New York Court of Appeals, but
"do[es] not seek out law review articles for case compilations—we have a variety of manual and
computerized research tools for such information."). See also, Lasson, supra note 37, 937 ("With the
advent of computerized data banks such as Lexis and Westlaw, gleaning all the cases on point is as
easy as playing Trivial Pursuit and maybe even more fun.").
40 James H. Fowler & Sangick Deon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC. NETWORKS
16, 16 (2008) (citing statements by Justices Ginsburg, Powell, and Stevens in support of the notion
that judges, "are aware of the inherent weakness of the federal judiciary and place high value on
maintaining their institutional and decisional legitimacy through the use of precedent"); see also
David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful
Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 337, 339 (1997) (offering two "central" reasons for
the judicial use of citations: "The first is that citations indicate intercourt communication and
influence on judicial decisionmaking . . . The second, and contrasting, view is that . . . citations are
used to justify those decisions . . . That is, citations are seen as serving a primary function of
legitimation.").
41 Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 495, 510–11 (2000). The quantity of data has also increased exponentially. See Bernard
Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats Everyone Should Read,
FORBES, (May 21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-dowe-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-should-read/ [https://perma.cc/SE3C-5FBM]
("There are 2.5 quintillion bytes of data created each day at our current pace, but that pace is only
accelerating . . . Over the last two years alone 90 percent of the data in the word was generated.").
42 See e.g., John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in Supreme Court Opinions,
94 LAW LIBR. J. 427, 442 (2002) ("[V]irtually every discipline, scientific or not, has become fair game
for citation."); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of
Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 496, 509 (2000) (authors found a threefold increase in citation to
nonlegal sources by the U.S. Supreme Court from 1990 to 1998, and similar results in a sample of
New Jersey Supreme Court opinions over the same period) and Ellie Margolis, Authority without
Borders: The World-Wide Web and the Delegalization of the Law, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 920–21
(2011) (citing several studies finding increased citation of nonlegal materials in judicial opinions).
43 Daniels, supra note 19, at 4 (finding a 416% increase in the number of citations to secondary
sources per opinion and an increase in citation to nonlegal sources of 1,429% from the 1900 Term to
the 1978 Term).
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traditional legal databases like Lexis and Westlaw now provide ready access to
more than just traditional primary and secondary legal authority. 44
INCREASES IN CASE LAW AND CASELOAD
Beyond the greater ease of locating case law on Lexis and Westlaw, there was also
more of it. The exponential increase in the number of published and unpublished
opinions over the period of study 45 meant that as time went on, judges simply had
less need to consult law reviews to resolve the issues before them. 46 As the body of
common law continually expands to cover new topics and factual scenarios, judges
are more likely to locate relevant opinions to substantiate their decisions, leaving
law reviews for difficult cases involving "new or unsettled area[s] of law." 47

Schauer & Wise, supra note 41, at 511–13 (comparing the ease of accessing various nonlegal
sources through Lexis and Westlaw at the turn of the millennium against the additional steps
necessary less than thirty years prior). For example, Lexis Advance now offers access to news,
medical and scientific publications, directories, and public records.
45 See Figure __, "Number of Opinions in Lexis Advance 1945-2018"; see also Merritt E. McAlister,
Downright Indifference: Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 118
MICH. L. REV. 533, 542–46 (2020) (describing the increased caseload and proliferation of unpublished
opinions at the federal appellate level since the 1960s, leading to the promulgation of Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1 expressly authorizing citation of unpublished opinions in the circuit courts
as of January 1, 2007).
46 Pierce & Reuben, supra note 32, at 1196–97 ("[T]here is, quite simply, little need for a judge to
support his or her opinion with a law review article if there is a case on point.").
47 Id. at 1196 (quoting Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV.
295, 296 (2000)) ("[T]he opinions most likely to rely on the works of academics are those written in
the gray areas of the law where precedent doesn't provide a clear-cut answer."); see also Thomas L.
Ambro, Citing Legal Articles in Judicial Opinions: A Sympathetic Antipathy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J.
547, 549 (2006) (noting that he attempts to dispel the doubt that arises when deciding difficult cases
by consulting all "reputable source[s] of information . . . This is where articles can play a significant
role.").
44

This ever-greater quantity of case law is a direct result of increasing caseloads faced
by the judiciary, 48 and has also likely reduced judges' reliance on legal scholarship,
as the data from a 2011 study of federal appellate courts "suggest[ed] that the
busier a court is, in terms of the work required of each judge, the less likely it is to
cite legal scholarship." 49 This certainly makes sense given that a judge or clerk
researching and writing under significant time constraints will likely focus on
researching, and thus citing, mandatory authority as opposed to non-binding
secondary sources. 50 That the judge may have little faith she will find an article

See e.g., Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Effectiveness of Measures to Increase
Appellate Court Efficiency and Decision Output, 21 U. MICH. J. LEGAL REFORM 415, 415 (1988)
(noting that appellate caseloads have doubled approximately every ten years since World War II)
and Shay Lavie, Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 57, 59 (2016)
(quoting Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287
(2006)) (between the years 1971 and 2005, there was "'a 500% increase in filings, and a 77% increase
in judgeships.' The result is a sizeable increase in the number of cases assigned to each judge.").
49 Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra note 12, at 1366 (noting also that other variables beyond a court's
workload likely influence citation to legal scholarship); see also McClintock, supra note 32, at 688
(citing FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 110
(1990)) (suggesting that an increase in judicial workloads may limit consultation of secondary
sources).
50 See Ambro, supra note 47, at 549 (discussing how time constraints require him to decide issues
based on cases cited in briefs or found during the course of his clerks' or his own research); see also
Ryan Whalen et al., Common Law Evolution and Judicial Impact in the Age of Information, 9 ELON
L. REV. 115, 134 (2017) ("Although there are many aspects of legal research, the search for relevant
precedent is the most fundamental form of legal information seeking.").
48

addressing the issue she is facing would only disincentivize her further from
investing her limited time attempting to locate one.
INCREASINGLY IMPRACTICAL SCHOLARSHIP—AN IVORY TOWER
AFTERTHOUGHT
The student editors of the inaugural issue of the Harvard Law Review shared the
aspiration that they were "not without hope that the Review may be serviceable to
the profession at large." 51 I think it is safe to say they succeeded. From these
humble beginnings, their journal and others like it would go on to have a
tremendous impact on legal education, the legal profession, and on American
society in general. 52
In the first decades of this study, as the proportion of citations increased, practical
scholarship remained an important goal for law reviews as an institution, as service
to the "practicing bar and the profession, and through them the nation as a whole"
was stressed along with their pedagogical mission within their law schools. 53 Law
reviews became more accepted by the bench and bar as a result of their value to the
profession, 54 while the goal of furthering academic discourse did not merit mention
among the primary objectives of law reviews in a 1952 article and was perhaps only
considered tangentially in another from 1967. 55 A generation later however, many
scholars had increasingly branched out from traditional or "doctrinal" legal
scholarship to engage each other in conversations that would largely exclude the
judiciary and practitioners. 56
Notes, 1 HARV. L. REV. 35 (1887).
See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960) (citing Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)) (calling Warren and Brandeis's
article "the outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American law") and
Newland, supra note 20, 483–88 (listing four other notable instances where law reviews influenced
the Supreme Court's legal reasoning).
53 John E. Cribbett, Experimentations in the Law Reviews, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 72, 74 (1952); see also
Noteboom & Walker, supra note 10, at 448 (describing the two purposes of the law review as
"educational value for the student" and "serv[ing] the profession directly").
54 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. Even then, law reviews were seen more as practical
research and teaching tools, not for their value to the reader. See Harold C. Havighurst, Law
Reviews and Legal Education, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 22, 24 (1956) ("Whereas most periodicals are
published primarily in order that they may be read, the law reviews are published primarily that
they may be written.") and Alan W. Mewett, Reviewing the Law Reviews, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 188, 188
(1955) ("Few reviews are read; and although most of them are skimmed over in the hope of finding
something worthwhile to read, some perhaps do not even have that honor conferred upon them.").
55 See Cribbet, supra note 53, at 74 and Noteboom & Walker, supra note 10, at 449 (suggesting that
in addition to their educational value and their service to the profession, law reviews "should
contribute something more than useless verbiage to the ever-growing volume of legal journalism").
56 See Laurens Walker, Developments in Law and Social Sciences Research, 52 N.C. L. REV. 969,
969–70 (1974) (citing David F. Cavers, "Non-Traditional" Research by Law Teachers: Returns from
51
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PUSHBACK AGAINST PRACTICALITY
This trend away from traditional scholarship began in the 1970s as the elite law
schools sought to differentiate themselves from their less-prestigious peers. 57 And
while much scholarship at this time still "reflect[ed] the impact of professional
demands upon the academy," 58 as elite institutions increasingly directed their
attention towards interdisciplinary studies and new schools of thought rather than
matters directly relevant to practice, 59 their status and outsized influence meant
this shift would have a disproportional effect on perceptions of the legal academy
and legal scholarship among the bench and bar, even as much useful scholarship
continued to be published. 60

the Questionnaire of the Council on Law-Related Studies, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 534, 543 (1972))
(observing that "[m]ost legal research to date has been doctrinal in nature . . . typically organize[d] . .
. around legal propositions and . . . us[ing] appellate court reports and other printed materials
readily accessible in law libraries as [the] principal . . . source of data," while also noting that
approximately one in six full time law faculty members surveyed in 1971 reported participating in
"non-traditional" [interdisciplinary] research). A previous study examining the types of articles
published in 1967 found only 54 articles out of more than 4,100 were based in empirical research.
Noteboom & Walker, supra note 10, at 442 ("The law reviews have been derelict in the area of
empirical research.").
57 Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1118 (1981)
(quoting Alumni Weekend, YALE L. REP. 4, 7–8 (1978-79)) (Judge Posner quotes Yale Law School
Dean Harry Wellington as saying, "[t]here are a dozen or so university law schools in the country
that can properly claim to be more than trade schools. A trade school is an institution that views its
purpose a graduating students who will pass a bar examination. Schools that are more than trade
schools share this purpose, but they are centrally concerned with the advance of knowledge through
teaching and research."); see also Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1221 (1981) (discussing Yale Law School's desire to maintain its elite status through
cutting edge scholarship).
58 Id. at 1208. The contemporaneous data supports this assertion, as the proportion and quantity of
opinions citing law reviews were at or near their respective peaks in this study.
59 For a description of the shift towards interdisciplinary studies in the academy, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 84–87 (1995); see also Bernard J. Hibbitts, supra note 36, at 640 (noting
the growth of interdisciplinary research and the increasing importance of scholarship beginning in
the mid-1970s). A further example of the shift away from practical scholarship at this time is the
decline in legal treatise writing. See A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal
Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 677–79 (1981) (positing that the
growth of legal realism led to the decline in authorship and prestige of treatises).
60 Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?:
A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 353,
370–71 (1996) (finding the ratio of articles perceived as "practical" versus theoretical decreased from
4.88 in 1960 to 1.11 by 1985, but due to the increase in scholarly output over that time, the actual
number of practical articles published increased from 736 to 1,296).

BACK TO "NO RESPECT AT ALL" 61
By the 1990s, this perception had largely become reality. 62 And even judges who
regularly consulted law reviews for "the newest thinking on [a] subject . . . [and
their] global yet profound perspective," noted that, "[p]rominent law reviews are
increasingly dedicated to abstract, theoretical subjects . . . and less and less to
practice and professional issues, and to the grist of state court dockets." 63 In the
most bellicose of these critiques from the bench at this time, Judge Harry Edwards
of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, bemoaned the lack of practical
scholarship in law reviews, categorizing law professors producing "mediocre
interdisciplinary articles" as "ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject
piques their interest, whether or not the subject merits legal scholarship." 64
Judge Richard Posner, who was perhaps the first member of the judiciary to note
the shift away from doctrinal analysis at the elite law schools, 65 agreed that "some

In 1953, Judge Stanley Fuld said that law reviews had "earned the real respect of the bench."
Fuld, supra note 30 at 918. Forty years later, they began to resemble the setup for one of comedian
Rodney Dangerfield's punchlines. See Life, RODNEY DANGERFIELD, www.rodney.com
[https://perma.cc/3ZFN-P5RY] (last visited July 13, 2020) ("Some chatty mob guys were the
unintended inspiration for his signature catchphrase, 'I don’t get no respect.' Rodney overheard them
talking about respect—during one of his shows—and it was a Eureka moment for him."); see also
David Hricik and Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like This One: Law
Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 761, 778 (2005) ("Articles that have little or no perceived value to anyone but a few law
professors will come to be read only by those few law professors.").
62 The idea that "perception is reality" entered our lexicon around this time, having been made
famous by political strategist Lee Atwater during George H.W. Bush's 1988 presidential campaign.
See Simon Kelner, Perception is reality: The facts won't matter in next year's general election,
INDEPENDENT October 30, 2014 https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/perception-is-realitythe-facts-wont-matter-in-next-years-general-election-9829132.html.
63 Kaye, supra note 39, at 319; see also Kozinski, supra note 47, at 297 (Judge Kozinski described
himself as a "big fan" of legal scholarship in his address, but also felt that, "[a]s best I can tell . . .
some academics have almost a disdain for judicial interest in their work—or for whether and how
their work will influence the outcome of cases."). But see Dolores K. Sloviter, In Praise of Law
Reviews, 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 7, 7 (2002) (Judge Sloviter commended law reviews as "an expeditious
vehicle by which to receive a comprehensive introduction to an unfamiliar field of law . . . [and] an
entrée into the most sophisticated thinking on the latest issues and trends").
64 Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992); see also United States v. $639,558, 955 F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Silberman, J., concurring) ("[M]any of our law reviews are dominated by rather exotic offerings of
increasingly out-of-touch faculty members."). Several likeminded scholars joined the fray as well. See
e.g., Lasson, supra note 37, at 931 (calling lead articles "often overwhelming collections of minutiae,
perhaps substantively relevant at some point in time to an individual practitioner or two way out in
the hinterlands—and that almost entirely by chance") and Thomas E. Baker, Tyrannous Lex, 82
IOWA L. REV. 689, 712 (1997) ("[L]aw reviews are to law what masturbation is to sex. They are a form
of self-gratification for law professors and law students. They do not satisfy the needs of others.").
65 See Posner, supra note 57.
61

crazy stuff is being published in law reviews nowadays," 66 but suggested that rather
than "undergoing a serious decline . . . production [of doctrinal scholarship had]
shifted towards scholars at law schools of the second and third tier." 67
This shift away from practical, doctrinal scholarship at the elite law schools and in
their law reviews could help explain some of the shift away from the more
prestigious, but more theoretical journals explored below, 68 namely that the decline
in the number and proportion of opinions citing to law reviews shown in Part I was
driven in significant part by a decline in citations to the elite journals shown in Part
II. 69 Nevertheless, while the results of Part II show the gap in citation frequency
has narrowed, there remains a striking preference among the judiciary for citing
flagship journals from the elite law schools versus their less prestigious
counterparts.
PART II: THE ERODING BUT PERSISTENT CITATION ADVANTAGE OF ELITE
LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEWS
The second part of this study represents my attempt to see how the proportion of
opinions citing to flagship journals from several different law schools, selected and
grouped according to their average U.S. News Ranking, changed in relation to each
other as technology, legal scholarship, and academic legal publishing evolved over
the last forty-five plus years. The data shows a pronounced citation advantage for
journals from the elite schools, especially Harvard and Yale, as compared with
those further down the hierarchy. This difference was especially striking during the
1970s, and despite some evidence of democratization, it is still clearly visible in the
data for the most recent years of my study.

POSNER, supra note 59, at 101; see also Mary Ann Glendon, What's Wrong with Elite Law Schools,
WALL ST. J. June 8, 1993, at A16 (in a letter to the Wall Street Journal, Harvard Law School
Professor Mary Ann Glendon decried the "alarmingly widespread disdain for the useful forms of
legal scholarship that systematize, refine, and incrementally extend knowledge about 'law'").
67 Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1921, 1923 (1993). Judge Posner later noted that given "the increasingly able faculties of the lesser
law schools, [t]he shift in legal doctrinal scholarship toward those faculties can hardly be considered
a disaster for the profession." POSNER, supra note 59, at 95.
68 See infra text accompanying notes 84–88; see also Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 61, at 780 n.3
("We cannot ignore the fact that some of the most theoretical journals, those at the highest ranked
schools, for example, are considered the most prestigious despite the lack of engaged scholarship.")
and Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1321 (2002) ("Traditional
doctrinal scholarship is disvalued at the leading law schools. They want their faculties to engage in
'cutting edge' research and thus orient their scholarship toward, and seek their primary readership
among, other scholars, not even limited to law professors, though they are the principal audience.").
69 See McClintock, supra note 32, at 688 ("In light of the heated debate between academia and the
bar, the decline in [judicial citation of] legal scholarship seems at least in part attributable to the
proliferation of impractical scholarship.").
66

JOURNAL SELECTION METHODOLOGY
The U.S. News Best Law Schools Rankings, although controversial, 70 are the most
visible embodiment of a hierarchy that existed in the legal academy long before they
were first published. 71 Consequently, I used the Rankings as the basis for
categorizing and selecting the journals I included for comparison in this part of my
study, which looks at judicial citations over the years 1970 through 2018. Other
studies that have used the rankings found a strong correlation between a law
school’s rank and citations to its journals, 72 especially among higher ranked
schools. 73
Harvard and Yale were selected as the most elite law schools for the study since
they are the two most prestigious institutions in the country with the longest
continually running student-edited law reviews. 74 To choose the exemplar "Top-14"
See e.g., David A. Thomas, The Law School Rankings Are Harmful Deceptions: A Response to Those
Who Praise the Rankings and Suggestions for a Better Approach to Evaluating Law Schools, 40
HOUS. L. REV. 419, 423 (2003) ("[L]aw school rankings are so deeply and inherently flawed in concept
that their publication does a profound disservice to persons trying to evaluate law schools.") and
David Yamada, Same Old, Same Old: Law School Rankings and the Affirmation of Hierarchy, 31
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249, 261 ("[T]he obsession with prestige encouraged by these rankings nurtures
a dynamic in which the sizzle counts for more than the steak.").
71 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa et al., Enduring Hierarchies in American Legal Education, 89 IND. L.J.
941, 941, 998 (2014) (evaluating law schools over the decades prior to the U.S. News Rankings
through the modern era and finding "a consistent hierarchy of U.S. law schools from the 1930s to
present"); see also Donna Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile of the Teaching Branch of the Legal
Profession, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 501, 514–15 (a study conducted during the 1975-76
academic year showed twenty elite law schools produced almost 60% of full-time law faculty, while
graduates from five of those twenty schools [Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Michigan, and Chicago]
accounted for just under a third of all full-time faculty).
72 Ronen Perry, Correlation versus Causality: Further Thoughts on the Law Review/Law School
Liaison, 39 CONN. L. REV. 77, 83–84 (2006) (finding law school reputation drives differences in
citation: "law school reputation is usually the cause whereas law review success is the effect."); see
also Gregory Scott Crespi, Judicial and Law Review Citation Frequencies for Articles Published in
Different "Tiers" of Law Journals: An Empirical Analysis, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 897, 897 (2004)
("[B]oth courts and scholars cite articles that are published in the three most prestigious law
journals at much higher rates than they cite articles that appear in either mid-level or lower-tier law
journals . . . [and] courts virtually ignore altogether legal scholarship that appears in lower-tier law
journals.").
73 See Alfred L. Brophy, The Relationship between Law Review Citations and Law School Rankings,
39 CONN. L. REV. 43, 49 (2006) (noting a correlation between peer assessment score and citations in
law journals for schools in the top 100 using data from the U.S. News Rankings and the Washington
& Lee Journal Rankings); see also Ronen Perry, The Relative Value of American Law Reviews:
Refinement and Implementation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2006) (finding a correlation between the
overall rankings of law schools and their flagship journals, with a stronger correlation observed
among higher-ranked institutions) and Ronen Perry, The Relative Value of American Law Reviews: A
Critical Appraisal of Ranking Methods, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 35 (2006) (noting a correlation
between citation frequency and higher law school rankings, especially among higher-ranked
institutions).
74 See supra notes 1–2.
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law schools, I selected the three schools whose average ranking since 1987 fell
closest to nine, the average of four and fourteen, while for tiers I and II, I chose
twenty-five and seventy-five as my respective starting points for rankings. So for
Tier I schools, I started with those ranked from 20 to 29 in 2018, recorded and
averaged their ranks as far back as possible, and selected the three schools that
came closest to twenty-five over that period. 75 For Tier II, I had to expand my 2018
schools to those ranked 65-82 in order to find three schools that had never fallen
outside of Tier II or its earlier equivalents, "3rd Tier" and "Quartile 2." 76 Meanwhile,
Tier III schools showed the greatest variability, forcing me to select the institutions
that had fallen outside of Tier III or its equivalent the fewest number of years,
irrespective of average. 77 Lastly, the three Tier IV schools in my study were the only
law schools that never fell outside of Tier IV or its equivalent. 78
JOURNAL TITLE SEARCH METHODOLOGY
To generate my citation data for Part II, I created search strings comprising all of
the possible ways I could imagine a court might cite to a particular journal title, and
limited my results by year. 79 I would then scan my results and adjust my search as
needed to remove as many false positives as possible. 80 I also made sure to account
for any name changes to the journals included in my study, for example Notre Dame
Law Review was known as Notre Dame Lawyer until 1982, while Emory Law
Journal was originally published under the title Journal of Public Law. 81 I also
excluded online companion journals such as the Harvard Law Review Forum from

As this project moved forward over the ensuing two years, the exemplar schools remained the
same for all categories after factoring in the 2019 and 2020 U.S. News Rankings.
76 I also weighed ties in my rankings, so for example, if five law schools were each ranked 115, their
weighted rank would each be 117. I believe this provides a more accurate benchmark for comparison
between schools, as a difference as small as one point could see a school fall as many as twelve spots
in the rankings.
77 There was a four-way tie between Cleveland State, Creighton, New York Law School, and the
University of Missouri Kansas City, which I broke by choosing the school with the longest running
journal.
78 U.S. News divided law schools into five tiers in the mid-1990s.
79 ("albany law review" OR "albany l. rev." OR "albany law rev." OR "alb. l. rev." OR "alb. l.r." OR
"albany l.r.") & DA(aft 12-31-2017 & bef 01-01-2019).
80 This sometimes resulted in convoluted, but hopefully more accurate search strings: ("california
law review" OR "california l. rev." OR "california law rev." OR "cal. l. rev." OR "cal. l.rev" OR "cal.
l.r.") & DA(aft 12-31-2017 & bef 01-01-2019) and not("s. cal. l. rev.") and not ("so. cal. l. rev.") and
not("southern california law review") and not("comm. reports") and not("law review commission") and
not("l. rev. circuit") and not("law review circuit") and not("l. rev. cir.") and not("d. cal. l.r.") and
not("dist. cal. l.r.") and not("district of cal. l.r.") and not("s. cal. l.r.") and not("so. cal. l.r.") and
not("cd cal. l.r.") and not("22 cal. l.r.").
81 ("notre dame law review" OR "notre dame l. rev." OR "notre dame law rev." OR "notre dame law."
OR "notre dame lawyer" OR "n.d. lawyer") & DA(aft 12-31-2017 & bef 01-01-2019) and not("notre
dame l. rev. online") and not("notre dame law review online") and not("notre dame law school").
75

my searches since I considered them separate publications. 82 Lastly, since this
study focuses on the proportion of opinions citing to law reviews as opposed to the
overall number of citations, I ultimately combined the search strings for my
journals into one query for each grouping, so if an opinion cited both the California
Law Review and the Virginia Law Review, for example, it would not be counted
twice.
FINDINGS OF FAVORITISM
I suspected the judiciary would cite to the Harvard Law Review, the Yale Law
Journal, and the other high-ranked schools more often than those farther down the
rankings, but I did not expect the difference to be as profound as the data reflected.
These results suggest that perceived prestige of a law school is an important
consideration when judges decide whether and to which law reviews they cite.
Harvard Law Review was cited in more opinions each year than any other journal
from 1970 through 2018, with citations in more than twice the number of cases than
its closest competitor, Yale Law Journal, most years between 1970 and 2010, with
the gap narrowing somewhat over the past decade. Considered together, the
proportion of opinions citing to these two journals out of the total number of
reported opinions citing to at least one academic law review 83 was highest at the
beginning of the study period, reaching 34.4% in 1971. 84 Meaning that, of all
reported opinions in Part I that cited at least one academic legal periodical that
year, more than one in three of those opinions cited either Harvard Law Review,
Yale Law Journal, or both titles. This proportion decreased fairly steadily
thereafter, falling below 25% in 1983, below 20% in 1989, and finally below 15% in
2000, where it has remained since, reaching a low of 10.9% in 2007.

82 ("harvard law review" OR "harvard l. rev." OR "harvard law rev." OR "harv. l. rev." OR "harv. l.r."
OR " review forum") and not("harv. l. rev. forum").
83 This was my combined search for opinions citing to the Harvard Law Review and Yale Law
Journal for the year 2018: ("harvard law review" OR "harvard l. rev." OR "harvard law rev." OR
"harv. l. rev." OR "harv. l.r." OR "harv lr" OR "harvard lr" OR "yale law journal" OR "yale l.j." OR
"yale law jour." OR "yale law j." OR "yale l. jour.") & DA(aft 12-31-2017 & bef 01-01-2019) and
not("harvard l. rev. forum") and not("harvard law review forum") and not("harv. l. rev. forum") and
not("yale l.j. forum") and not("yale law journal forum") and not("yale l. jour. forum") and not("yale l.j.
online") and not("yale law journal online") and not("yale l. jour. online") and not ("yale l.j. pocket
part"). I entered the resulting number of reported opinions for each year into a spreadsheet, and
divided that number by the total number of reported opinions from that year that cited at least one
academic legal periodical (taken from Part I) and multiplied by 100 to arrive at my proportional
percentage.
895 (# 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 and/or 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌)
84
= .3438 x 100 = 34.4%

2,603 (# 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)

My findings largely mirror those of other studies that found courts cited journals
from elite law schools far more often than their less prestigious counterparts. 85
These studies almost invariably showed Harvard Law Review as the clear favorite
among the judiciary. 86 This was also true in the decades leading up to the 1970s. 87

See, e.g., Saks et al., supra note 60, at 367 ("The rate of citation was about four times greater for
articles in top-quintile law journals [versus other law reviews]."); McClintock, supra note 32, at 689;
Crespi, supra note 72, at 909. Cf. Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and
Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400, 404 (1986) (this study shows less of an advantage for the elite
schools, but only looked at journal articles from one year).
86 See, e.g., McClintock, supra note 32, at 689 (finding Harvard Law Review received nearly twice as
many judicial citations as Yale Law Journal, and nearly three times as many citations as third place
Columbia Law Review); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 138, 142
(1986) (finding Harvard Law Review received more than twice as many citations as its nearest
competitors during the 1971-1973 and 1981-1983 October Supreme Court Terms); Crespi, supra note
72, at 906 (finding 54 judicial citations to the 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 volumes of the Harvard Law
Review, compared to 35 for the same volumes of the Yale Law Journal; however, Harvard Law
Review received fewer law review citations during that period than both Yale Law Journal and
Stanford Law Review). The lone exception that looked at judicial opinions was a study of citations to
journal articles from 1978-1979 using Shepard's Law Review Citations from 1984 finding Yale Law
Journal was the most-cited law review, while Harvard Law Review was fifth. Mann, supra note 85,
at 404.
87 See Douglas B. Maggs, supra note 21, at 195 (even at this relatively early stage, when only 43
academic law reviews were being published, Harvard Law Review had already emerged as the
leading journal with 53 total judicial citations, more than doubling the second-place Yale Law
Journal with eighteen citations) and Newland, supra note 20, at 482 (in a study of Supreme Court
opinions between the October Term, 1924 through the October Term of 1956, the Court cited
Harvard Law Review 399 times, more than double the 194 citations to the second-place Yale Law
Journal).
85

Law reviews from the study’s three "Top 14" law schools, the University at
California, Berkeley, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of
Virginia, were also heavily cited, although never as frequently as those from
Harvard and Yale. As was the case with Harvard Law Review and Yale Law
Journal, the proportion of opinions citing to these journals was highest during the
1970s, reaching as high as 14.1% in 1970, then declining below 10% beginning in
1984, below 5% in both 2002 and 2003, then remaining between 5.1 and 6.6%
through 2018. Additionally, the total proportion of opinions citing to at least one of
the journals from these three law schools remained below the total proportion of
opinions citing to either Harvard Law Review or Yale Law Journal, despite the fact
that the Top 14 group included citations for three journals instead of two.

My exemplar Tier I law reviews were from Emory University School of Law, Notre
Dame Law School, and the University of Iowa College of Law. Their combined
citation rate was remarkably stable compared to the higher ranked schools above,
reaching a high of 4.9% in 1973, and averaging 3.6% over the period of study, with a
standard deviation of .005, as compared to .026 for the three Top 14 journals, and
.075 for the Harvard and Yale data.
My Tier II law schools were Loyola University of Chicago, the University of Kansas,
and the University of Miami, while Albany, Drake University, and the University of
Missouri at Kansas City represented Tier III. The data for the journals from the
Tier II and Tier III law schools showed even less variability than the Tier I data,
with a standard deviation of .003 for both datasets. Interestingly, the Tier III law
reviews averaged slightly more citations than Tier II, with a mean of 1.6% versus
1.4%. This indicates there may be less prestige variance between law schools in the
eyes of the judiciary as one moves down the rankings into Tier II and Tier III
institutions. 88

See Perry, supra note 72, at 88 ("Law review success is determined to a great extent by school
reputation . . . [A]s we go down the school rankings . . . the gaps between the schools' reputations get
smaller. The differences in attractiveness between the respective law reviews must also become
smaller.").
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Finally, journals from the Tier IV law schools included in the study, New England,
North Carolina Central University, and Texas Southern University, were cited least
often, exceeding 0.5% only two times during the period of study. On average, this
group of journals appeared in only 0.26% of the total number of reported opinions
citing to academic legal periodicals between 1970 and 2018. The Tier IV dataset
also had the lowest standard deviation among the journal groupings, .001.
Given these pronounced differences in citation rates between the different
groupings of journals and the significant decrease in the proportion of citations to
the elite journals over time, the balance of the article will be devoted to exploring
potential reasons for the historic and continuing judicial preference for citing law
reviews from the elite law schools and how changes in technology and academic
publishing, have helped erode but not erase that advantage.
REASONS JUDGES FAVOR ELITE LAW REVIEWS
One factor that may drive up citations to elite law reviews is that journals from
higher ranked schools tend to publish lengthier articles, and publish more articles
per volume. 89 This larger quantity of material gives their law reviews more

89

Saks et al., supra note 60, at 365.

opportunities to be cited, 90 even as they devote more space within their journals to
more esoteric or nondoctrinal topics. 91
In addition to publishing fewer and shorter articles, the extent to which law reviews
at lower ranked schools focus on more localized issues will also impact their
potential relevance to the judiciary. Devoting articles or even entire issues to
surveys of state law, for instance, may increase the likelihood of being cited by
courts within a law school's home state, 92 but would substantially decrease the
likelihood of being cited outside of it. 93
The prevalence of graduates of elite law schools among the judiciary, both among
judges and their clerks 94 could also help explain some of the favoritism they show
for journals from higher ranked law schools. 95 At least one study suggested that
judges are more likely to cite journals from their alma mater, 96 which makes sense
at least intuitively given the attachment that many of us feel to the educational

James Leonard, Seein' the Cites: A Guided Tour of Citation Patterns in Recent American Law
Review Articles, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 181, 193 (1990) ("Logically, all other things being equal, law
reviews with more pages will be cited more frequently than less lengthy titles simple because there
is more material to cite.").
91 See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text.
92 Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals
Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871, 885 (1996); see also Noteboom &
Walker, supra note 10, at 448 (the majority of judges and attorneys responding to a 1966 survey "felt
quite strongly that there should be increased emphasis on state law and other matters of local
concern").
93 See Mann, supra note 85, at 415 (finding that journals whose scholarship focused on national
issues had a higher rate of citation versus localized journals).
94 Jason Iuliano & Avery Stewart, The New Diversity Crisis in the Federal Judiciary, 84 TENN. L.
REV. 247, 279–98 (2016) (finding graduates from elite law schools, and Harvard in particular, are
over-represented across the federal judiciary, with this discrepancy having increased significantly
over the course of the twentieth century. The authors found a similar trend among those selected for
federal clerkships, with graduates from the top five schools representing 24% of the total across the
country. This advantage was even more pronounced among U.S. Supreme Court clerks, with
graduates of Harvard and Yale law schools representing 24.8 and 19% of all clerks, respectively,
between 1950 and 2015).
95 See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 86, at 133–34 ("[J]udicial clerks hailing largely from elite
schools may tend to cite the publications of their respective alma maters in their memoranda and
opinion drafts.").
96 See e.g., Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review – A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska
Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997) (finding judges who
graduated from the University of Nebraska accounted for 40% of the Nebraska Supreme Court's
opinions citing to the Nebraska Law Review, while graduates of Creighton University School of Law
were less likely to cite it, accounting for 29% of the opinions citing the Nebraska Law Review.
Meanwhile, judges who graduated from Creighton Law School were "nearly twice as likely (15 to 8)
to cite the Creighton Law Review compared with their judicial colleagues who graduated from the
University of Nebraska").
90

institutions we attended. 97 So not only are they likely to favor the law review they
may have worked for during law school, as graduates of elite law schools
themselves, they may also internalize the same value judgments about lower
ranked law schools that motivate the hiring decisions of their judges. 98 In fact, it is
this longstanding elitism that is likely the most impactful factor driving citations
disproportionately in favor of law reviews from elite law schools, both in the
academy and among the bench and bar. 99
Indeed, the late Justice Antonin Scalia admitted this bias in his selection of law
clerks, 100 a bias that seems at least tacitly shared by many of his Supreme Court
colleagues. 101 It does not take a great inferential leap to suggest this elitism is also
present when judges decide whether or not to cite to a particular article when
writing an opinion. 102

See e.g., Scott Gaier, Alumni Satisfaction with Their Undergraduate Academic Experience and the
Impact on Alumni Giving and Participation, 5 INT'L J. EDUC. ADVANCEMENT 283–84 (2005)
(reporting significant increases in both philanthropy and participation among alumni based on their
reported level of satisfaction with their undergraduate academic experiences) and Fred Mael &
Blake E. Ashforth, Alumni and their alma mater: A partial test of the reformulated model of
organizational identification, 13 J. ORG. BEHAV. 102, 112–17 (1992) (noting that organizational
prestige can enhance alumni attachment to their institution: "[H]ighly regarded schools are often
steeped in lore and traditions which glorify their uniqueness and excellence.").
98 William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Pedigree Problem: Are Law School Ties Choking
the Profession?, ABA J. (July 1, 2012 10:20 AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_pedigree_problem_are_law_school_ties_choking_th
e_profession [https://perma.cc/W9NJ-QN9C] ("Students vetted through the rankings-era admissions
process are now mid-career professionals who . . . strongly adhere to law school brands"); see also
infra text accompanying notes 100–102.
99 Merritt & Putnam, supra note 92, at 890 (citing Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751 (1996)) (study compared most-cited articles from judicial
opinions over the years 1989 – 1991 with the results of another study of most-cited articles
appearing in legal periodicals over the same time period, finding "judges resemble academic authors
in drawing their most heavily cited articles disproportionately from a few elite journals . . . [however,
they] appear more willing to reach beyond the most prestigious journals in citing certain articles
repeatedly.").
100 Adam Liptak, On the Bench and Off, the Eminently Quotable Justice Scalia, N.Y. TIMES (May 11,
2009) https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/us/12bar.html [https://perma.cc/GJ3C-7HTU] (while
explaining to a law student from American University why she is unlikely to be selected for a U.S.
Supreme Court Clerkship, Justice Scalia told her, "By and large, I'm going to be picking from the law
schools that basically are the hardest to get into. They admit the best and brightest, and they may
not teach very well, but you can't make a sow's ear out of a silk purse. If they come in the best and
brightest, they're probably going to leave the best and brightest, O.K.?").
101 Id. ("Over the last six years, the justices have hired about 220 law clerks. Almost half went to
Harvard or Yale. Chicago, Stanford, Virginia, and Columbia collectively accounted for 50 others.").
102 Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme Court's Use of
Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. at 1020 ("Our results are consistent with the possibility that
the [U.S. Supreme] Court is taking prestige of some sort when it uses legal scholarship. It might take
the prestige of the author . . . [or] of the publishing law review or the institution affiliated with the
law review.").
97

This bias is certainly present in the academy as well, where a disproportionate
number of professors come from the most elite law schools, 103 and tenure decisions
can hinge on placement in top law reviews. 104 And while elitism is perhaps most
visible among the practicing bar during the hiring process, 105 as with the judiciary,
I find it unlikely that these biases do not intrude once attorneys remove their
"hiring caps" to work on research and writing. This makes them more likely to cite
to elite journals in their briefs, which the court may, in turn, incorporate into its
own analysis. 106
It is also possible that these differences in citation frequency reflect actual
qualitative differences between articles published in the elite schools' journals
versus those from less prestigious schools. It would follow that the "best and
brightest" students, 107 whose journals attract the most renowned scholars, 108 would
be in a position to produce the highest quality scholarship, but this is also difficult

See Howard A. Glickstein, Law Schools: Where The Elite Meet To Teach, 10 NOVA L.J. 541, 542–43
(citing LAW SCHOOLS AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1980))
("59% of all law school teachers possessed J.D. degrees from one of the 20 top 'producer' schools,
while almost 90% of tenure track faculty at the 20 'producer' schools held the J.D. from those same
schools. Nearly a third of full-time law teachers received their J.D. degrees from one of five law
schools (Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Michigan and Chicago).").
104 See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, The Signaling Value of Law Reviews: An Exploration of Citations and
Prestige, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 230 (2009) (describing the practice of "trading up" where faculty
rescind a previously accepted journal placement when they receive an offer from a more prestigious
journal, adding "for purposes of job placement and pay increases, it is not unreasonable to assume
that articles placed in more prominent journals are more useful, as a general matter, than articles
placed in less prominent journals. In fact, some schools are reputed to pay bonuses for articles placed
in highly regarded journals. This is because evaluators use journal placement as a proxy for article
quality."). See also Lisa Anderson, Law Journals Attack "Shopping" of Manuscripts, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 1995, at B6, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/12/us/law-journals-attack-shopping-ofmanuscripts.html [https://perma.cc/6LY9-MQQ7]. ("Law professors know that to move into their
profession's tenured ranks their work must be published in law journals, the more prestigious the
better.").
105 Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 98 ("Snobbism and elitism are the last socially acceptable
prejudices . . . largely rooted in vanity and identity, . . . [t]his near obsession with pedigree is not only
paralyzing to the career prospects of individual lawyers; it is damaging to the entire profession.").
106 See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 86, at 133 ("Attorneys may rely primarily on supportive
articles in elite journals, because they hope that a journal's name will increase an article's
persuasive power.") and William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A
Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267, 274 (2002) (comparing citations contained in briefs
submitted to the Supreme Court during the October 1996 Term with citations appearing in the
Court's opinions and finding 9.5% of legal periodicals in the winning side's briefs were also cited by
the Court, while 7% of those from losing brief were cited).
107 See Liptak, supra note 100.
108 See Jason P. Nance & Dylan Steinberg, The Law Review Article Selection Process: Results from a
National Study, 71 ALB. L. REV. 565, 589 (2008) (explaining student editors' consideration of author
reputation in making editorial decisions to secure a competitive advantage for their journal).
103

to measure. 109 I also find it unlikely that qualitative differences alone can explain
the stark discrepancies in citation frequency reflected in the data. However, the fact
that these hierarchical differences in citation frequency have decreased suggests
that judges have become more focused on the content of a journal rather than the
name on the cover, or that the qualitative gap between the journals has narrowed
over time. 110 More likely, it is a culmination of many factors, including those
explored below that have driven these changes.
MIND THE (NARROWING) GAP: REASONS THE ELITE LAW REVIEW
CITATION ADVANTAGE HAS ERODED
Some of the factors behind the overall decline in judicial citation of law reviews
have also helped to level a playing field that elitism and tradition had tilted steeply
in favor of journals from the most prestigious law schools. Changes to the process of
locating and retrieving legal information driven by technology and the expansion
and evolution of scholarship into new areas driven by the elite law schools helped
narrow the citation gap between law reviews from the lower and higher-ranked law
schools. Additionally, the sharp increase in the number of legal periodicals being
published over the period of study undoubtedly diluted the citation advantage of the
elite journals, driving down the relative frequency with which they were cited.
TECHNOLOGY: THE CONTINUING EFFECT OF CALR
When Lexis and Westlaw began adding full-text, searchable law review articles to
their databases in 1982, it marked the beginning of a slow but wholesale change in
the way that legal researchers would access journal articles. Since both databases
only added select titles to their databases, they initially increased discoverability of
only those (mostly prominent) journals, which likely exacerbated the citation gap
between the different institutions. 111 However, as they expanded their selection of
periodicals, Lexis and Westlaw, along with HeinOnline112 and LegalTrac, 113

But see Crespi, supra note 72, at 917 ("[B]ecause of the filtering and sorting effects of the
competitive editorial process . . . tier-specific differences in citation frequencies . . . might reflect with
some accuracy the relative quality of the articles themselves.").
110 See POSNER, supra note 59, at 95 ("No area of practice or doctrine is beyond the intellectual
competence of the increasingly able faculties of the lesser law schools.").
111 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 376; see also Hood, supra note 35, at 112 (noting as of 1987
that Lexis offered full-text coverage of "over thirty" journals dating back to 1982, while Westlaw
provided incomplete coverage for "many more" journals than Lexis over the same time period, but
complete coverage for "top" legal journals only).
112 HeinOnline established its online presence in May 2000. Joe Gerken, The Invention of
HeinOnline, 18 AALL SPECTRUM 17 (Feb. 2014), https://heinonline.org/HeinDocs/Gerken.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JXW-ALDE].
113 LegalTrac was initially offered on disc before moving online. See Scott L. Rawnsley, 6 LEGAL
REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 169, 174 (1986).
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democratized legal research by facilitating discovery and access to all legal
periodicals. 114
Once legal researchers began using these services, where search results are
typically ranked by relevance and articles can be accessed with the click of a button,
they would no longer need to pull a physical volume from a shelf. 115 In theory, this
should lead to a greater tendency for judges and clerks to consult all legal
periodicals rather than just the most prestigious publications since online
researchers are presumably "less likely to focus on the source and instead . . . focus
more directly on the content of the material." 116
However, these technological changes may not have equated to a corresponding
increase in citations to all legal periodicals, as judges who consult even the most
useful article may nevertheless choose not to cite it. 117 Additionally, the fact that
judicial citations to the higher ranked law reviews began to decrease before the
introduction and widespread adoption of full-text electronic access to legal
periodicals indicates other factors have also contributed to this change.
THE IVY LEAGUE IVORY TOWER
The shift towards impractical scholarship at the more elite law schools beginning in
the 1970s and 80s, as discussed above, likely also contributed to this trend. 118 Quite
simply, as elite law reviews published increasingly esoteric articles, frustrated
judges were less likely to consult them. 119 Meanwhile, the fact that concurrent data
See Hibbitts, supra note 36, at 658–59.
Camille Broussard, Teaching with Technology: Is the Pedagogical Fulcrum Shifting?, 53 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 903, 910 (2009) ("Hypertext linking gives the reader the ability to move around in a
digitized textual document by opening a limitless array of additional links to other digitized
material.").
116 Margolis, supra note 42, at 934 (asserting that online research creates a blurring effect in regards
to types of authority consulted by the legal researcher). I suspect this point is also valid when
applied to different legal periodicals. But see Perry, supra note 73, at 32 (suggesting that, due to the
prohibitive volume of material available, scholars "may base their reading strategies on law schools'
reputation . . . assuming that journals of more prestigious schools will always publish better
papers").
117 See Paul L. Caron, The Long Tail of Legal Scholarship, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 41 (2006)
("Citations reflect one particular end-use of an article; they do not measure how many times an
article is read but not cited."); see also Kaye, supra note 39, at 313 n.2 ("I read a great many more
law review articles than I cite in my opinions.") and Margolis, supra note 42, at 917 ("New legal
researchers are taught that [secondary] sources are useful for gaining general background about the
law, but should rarely be cited directly in support of legal analysis.").
118 See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text.
119 See Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/us/19bar.html
[https://perma.cc/P3DJ-GCBD] (quoting Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Dennis Jacobs, "I
haven't opened up a law review in years . . . No one speaks of them. No one relies on them."); see also
McClintock, supra note 32, at 688 (speculating that one reason for the decline in judicial citations to
law reviews is that judges no longer read them).
114
115

for the exemplar journals from Tiers I-IV did not show a similar decrease as their
more prestigious counterparts provides further evidence that they retained their
relative value to the judiciary throughout the period of study. This is especially
notable considering the downward pressure exerted on the proportion of citations to
all periodicals as a result of the increasing number of new journals established from
the 1970s forward.
DILUTION
It is this final factor that I believe was most impactful in narrowing the hierarchical
gap between the different tiers of law reviews, the exponential increase in the
number of journals publishing legal content from the 1970s to present. These
additional titles and the corresponding increase in articles these new journals
published diluted the citation advantage enjoyed by the higher ranked law school
journals through their sheer volume. 120
For example, in 1970, the Current Index to Legal Periodicals indexed 132 journals;
by 2010, that number had increased to 616, 121 and today it stands at over 650, 122 an
increase of 392%. Researchers today can search 944 titles in Lexis Advance's Law
Reviews & Journals database 123 and 1,040 titles on Westlaw Edge. 124 And while
perhaps not as ubiquitous as Lexis and Westlaw, LegalTrac indexes more than
1,200 different legal periodicals, 125 while HeinOnline currently provides subscribers
with full-text access to over 2,800 different titles through their Law Journal
Library. 126 So not only are there far more law journals today than in the past,
articles are more easily discoverable for researchers than ever before.
Pierce & Reuben, supra note 32, at 1195 (authors labeled this concept "diffusion"); see also Robert
M. Lawless & Ira David, The General Role Played by Specialty Law Journals: Empirical Evidence
from Bankruptcy Scholarship, 80 AM. BANKR. L. J. 523 (2006) (in a study of legal scholarship in the
field of bankruptcy, authors' findings "suggest that specialty journals play a different role than do
the general law reviews, perhaps filling some of the lamented disjunction between the academy and
the practicing legal community, including judges").
121 Alena Wolotira, From a Trickle to a Flood: A Case Study of the Current Index to Legal Periodicals
to Examine the Swell of American Law Journals Published in the Last Fifty Years, 31 LEGAL
REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 150, 157 (2012) (showing an increase in the number of journals indexed by
Current Index to Legal Periodicals from 90 in 1960 to 616 in 2010).
122 CILP Journals, supra note 25.
123 Email to Celine Murphy, Lexis Practice Area Consultant, (Dec. 12, 2019 9:45 AM) (on file with
author).
124 Secondary Sources, WESTLAW EDGE,
https://www.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/SecondarySources/SecondarySourcesLibrary?transitionType
=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 (last visited July 7, 2020) To obtain my
total, I filtered my results by Publication Type to "Law Reviews & Journals" only.
125 Gale OneFile: LegalTrac, GALE, https://www.gale.com/c/onefile-legaltrac [https://perma.cc/ULR9PM2H] (last visited July 7, 2020).
126 Law Journal Library, HEINONLINE, https://home.heinonline.org/content/law-journal-library/
[https://perma.cc/C5DK-74CW] (last visited July 7, 2020).
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CONCLUSION
Given these changes and others sure to come over the decades ahead, it will be
interesting to see what the future holds in store for the student-edited law review.
As Judge Judith Kaye remarked over thirty years ago, "In time, the judiciary's
prejudice against citing law reviews gave way. More precisely, it collapsed and
vanished without a trace." 127 And while the contemporaneous data in his study
support Judge Kaye’s assertion, the data also shows that another prejudice has
endured, namely a strong bias among the courts in favor of citing law reviews from
the most prestigious law schools.
Additionally, while the judiciary’s prejudice against citing law reviews may have
vanished for a time, it seems to have come back into fashion, considering the overall
citation data from the last forty years and some of the criticisms from the bench
over that time. Of course, the law review as an institution has always had its
detractors, 128 but it has also endured for over a century and continues to evolve. In
fact, a study of Supreme Court opinions through 2010 found that Chief Justice
Roberts used legal scholarship in 23% of his opinions. 129 Despite the Chief Justice’s
well-known reservations about the practical value of law reviews, 130 this proportion
was roughly in line with his colleagues. 131 So perhaps there is some reason for
optimism on behalf of law reviews after all.
It remains to be seen if the recent increases in the proportion and quantity of
opinions citing law reviews in this study portend greater reliance on legal
scholarship by the courts in the coming years. Likewise, it will be interesting to see
if the factors discussed above in Part II and others we have yet to consider continue
to chip away at the citation advantage of the elite law reviews. In either case, only
time, and future inquiry, 132 will tell.
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APPENDIX A
My initial search included all academic journal citations possible before receiving a
"502 Gateway Error" message from Lexis, which excluded those titles receiving
fewer than seven citations during the period of study, 1945-2018. 133

("law review" OR "law journal" OR "l. rev." OR "law rev." OR "l.j." OR "l. jour." OR "jour. l." OR
"journal of law" OR "j.l. pub." OR "j. urb. l." OR "j.l. tech." OR "j. crim. l." OR "j. const. l." OR "j. corp.
l." OR "j. int'l. l." OR "j. int'l comp. l." OR "j. juv. l." OR "j. envtl. l." OR "j. fam. l." OR "j. on legis."
OR "l. pol'y" OR "j. pub. l." OR "wash. u.l.q." OR "cornell l.q." OR "notre dame law." OR "n.y.u. l.q."
OR "w.va. l.q." OR "l. soc. change" OR "am. crim. l.q." OR "ill. l. forum" OR "rev. col. abog." OR "j.
pol. econ." OR "am. j. juris." OR "crim. l.q." OR "l.sch. j." OR "evtl. aff." OR "miami l.q." OR "iowa l.
bull." OR "ind. legal forum" OR "marshall l.q." OR "harv. l. sch. bull." OR "duke bar" OR "n.y. l.
forum" OR "urb. l. ann." OR "j. legal educ." OR "n.y. law forum" OR "neb. l. bull." OR "tul. tax. inst."
OR "so. l.q." OR "ky. st. l. forum" OR "race rel. rep." OR "inst. on est." OR "u. ill. l.f." OR "j. small
emerging bus. l." OR "n.y.l.f." OR "qlr" OR "clara law." OR "widener l. symp. j." OR "j. prac. proc." OR
"crim. just. j." OR "law soc. ord." OR "j. art tech." OR "surv. int'l comp. l." OR "j. corp. fin. comm. l."
OR "j. bus. entrepreneurship" OR "j. eur. l." OR "j. complex litig." OR "j. soc. just." OR "transnat'l l.
contemp. probs." OR "j.l. comm." OR "u. bus. rev." OR "j. sports l." OR "l. soc. just." OR "j.l. religion"
OR "j.l. family" OR "appalachian j.l." OR "j. health biomedical" OR "j. civ. rts." OR "l. psychol. rev."
OR "j. conflict resol." OR "hall cir. rev." OR "j. bus. sec. l." OR "hum. rts. j." OR "fla. tax rev." OR "yale
j. on reg." OR "j.l. sci. tech." OR "sports law. j." OR "j. int'l bus." OR "ecol. l.q." OR "j. global legal
stud." OR "rev. banking fin." OR "l. bus. rev." OR "j. oil gas energy l." OR "crim. just. j." OR "j. med.
l." OR "j.l. liberty" OR "j. affordable housing" OR "n.c. banking inst." OR "j. tech. intell." OR "j.
gender race" OR "j.l. fam." OR "j. bus. tech. l." OR "cath. law." OR "u. mass. l. rev." OR "j. health
pol'y" OR "j. pub. int. l." OR "j. race l." OR "j. gender soc. pol'y" OR "animal l." OR "j. ent. tech." OR
"const. comment" OR "health matrix" OR "j.l. feminism" OR "j. women l." OR "contemp. legal issues"
OR "sup. ct. rev." OR "j. app. prac." OR "temple l.q." OR "j.l. educ." OR "bill rts. j." OR "va. tax rev."
OR "j. soc. pol'y l." OR "j.l. reform" OR "chi. legal f." OR "rev. l. pol." OR "seton hall legis. j." OR "rev.
litig." OR "j. disp. resol." OR "j.l. ethics" OR "rev. l. soc." OR "j.l. bus." OR "surv. am. l." OR "law pol'y
int'l" OR "law contemp. probs." OR "j. legal prof." OR "j. legal stud." OR "j.l. soc." OR "j.l. econ." OR
"j. intell. prop." OR "j. empirical legal stud." OR "health l. pol'y" OR "j. air l." OR "j. legis." OR "envtl.
l. pol'y rev." OR "j. computer info. l." OR "j. bus. l." OR "const. l.q." OR "geo. j. legal ethics" OR "j.
corp. fin. l." OR "j. land use envtl." OR "emp. pol'y j." OR "bankr. dev. j." OR "l. pol'y f." OR "j. agric.
l." OR "j. health care l." OR "j.l. arts" OR "j. transnat'l l." OR "j.l. soc. probs." OR "j.l. gender" OR "j.
corp. fin. com. l." OR "j. sci. tech. l." OR "j. gender l." OR "j. lab. emp. l." OR "j. emp. lab. l." OR
"akron tax j." OR "law ineq." OR "j. trial advoc." OR "rev. int'l arb." OR "ark. l. notes" OR "rev. jur.
u.p.r." OR "ecology l.q." OR "crim. civ. confinement" OR "nat. resources j." OR "j. urb. contemp. l." OR
"j. on disp. resol." OR "j. contemp. l." OR "j.l. health" OR "j. int'l law" OR "rev. der. p.r." OR "sports
ent. l." OR "resources envtl. l." OR "annals health l." OR "l. fam. stud." OR "j. comp. int'l l." OR "j.
hum. rts." OR "ann. rev. banking l." OR "j. trial app. advoc." OR "lab. rel. rev." OR "j.l. fam." OR "j.
high tech. l." OR "j.l. com." OR "balt. l.f." OR "j.c.r. c.l." OR "commlaw" OR "cap. def. j." OR
"transnat'l law." OR "l. tech. j." OR "inst. on fed. tax'n" OR "rutgers l. rec." OR "soc. serv. rev." OR "f.
on c.l. c.r." OR "j. civil rts." OR "legal rts. j." OR "j.l. pol." OR "j. for soc. just." OR "j. afr-am. l." OR
"civ. rts. econ." OR "chi.-kent" OR "j. child fam. advoc." OR "j. s. legal hist." OR "j.c.r. econ.") & DA
(aft 12-31-2017 & bef 01-01-2019) and not ("n.y.l.j.") and not ("comm. reports") and not ("law review
commission") and not ("law rev. comm") and not ("law rev. commn") and not ("law rev. com.") and not
("tax law rev.") and not ("admin. l. rev." and not ("mil. l. rev.") and not ("mass. l. rev.") and not
("bank. inst. l. rev.") and not ("am. j. int'l l.") and not ("am. j. comp. l.") and not ("a.f. l. rev.") and not
("fed. cts. l. rev.") and not ("am. l. rev.") and not ("mod. l. rev.") and not ("notre dame law school").
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Due to the high number of false positives I received by including "l.j." in my initial
search, I decided to run a second search and exclude the results from my initial
totals, while ensuring all possible citation variations to academic law journals
would not be subtracted. 134 This search accounted for all academic journals with the

("l.j.") & DA(aft 12-31-2010 & bef 01-01-2012) and not ("l. rev.") and not ("yale l.j.") and not
("georgetown l.j.") and not ("hastings l.j.") and not ("duke l.j.") and not ("alb. l.j.") and not ("albany
l.j.") and not ("cornell l.j.") and not ("emory l.j.") and not ("ind. l.j.") and not ("indiana l.j.") and not
("rutgers l.j.") and not ("widener l.j.") and not ("geo. l.j.") and not ("n.c. cent. l.j.") and not ("miss. l.j.")
and not ("ill. l.j.") and not ("tex. l.j.") and not ("texas l.j.") and not ("ky. l.j.") and not ("hast. l.j.") and
not ("tech.l.j.") and not ("depaul bus.") and not ("berkeley bus. l.j.") and not ("hastings bus. l.j.") and
not ("duq. bus. l.j.") and not ("rutgers bus. l.j.") and not ("entrepen. bus. l.j.") and not ("davis bus. l.j.")
and not ("vand. l.j.") and not ("u.p.r. bus. l.j.") and not ("rico bus. l.j.") and not ("nevada l.j.") and not
("chi. l.j.") and not ("kentucky l.j.") and not ("mary's l.j.") and not ("marys l.j.") and not ("ohio l.j.")
and not ("nev. l.j.") and not ("denver l.j.") and not ("brandeis l.j.") and not ("basin l.j.") and not ("hall
l.j.") and not ("thomas l.j.") and not ("hamline l.j.") and not ("willamette l.j.") and not ("rock l.j.") and
not ("ualr l.j.") and not ("washburn l.j.") and not ("wash. l.j.") and not ("u. ark. l.j.") and not ("hasting
l.j.") and not ("tulsa l.j.") and not ("wyoming l.j.") and not ("blackletter l.j.") and not ("coastal l.j.") and
not ("wyo. l.j.") and not ("nova l.j.") and not ("denv. l.j.") and not ("den. l.j.") and not ("louis l.j.") and
not ("howard l.j.") and not ("how. l.j.") and not ("cam. l.j.") and not ("camden l.j.") and not ("u.a.l.r.
l.j.") and not ("marshall l.j.") and not ("state l.j.") and not ("u. l.j.") and not ("univ. l.j.") and not ("det.
l.j.") and not ("envtl. l.j.") and not ("envt. l.j.") and not ("env. l.j.") and not ("st. l.j.") and not ("const.
l.j.") and not ("world l.j.") and not ("admin l.j. am.") and not ("pac. l.j.") and not ("pacific l.j.") and not
("sci. l.j.") and not ("l.j. sci.") and not ("y.l.j.") and not ("md. l.j.") and not ("int'l l.j.") and not ("intl.
l.j.") and not ("international l.j.") and not ("interest l.j.") and not ("int. l.j.") and not ("hofstra lab. l.j.")
and not ("comp. lab. l.j.") and not ("educ. l.j.") and not ("prop. l.j.") and not ("can.-u.s. l.j.") and not
("ent. l.j.") and not ("entertainment l.j.") and not ("conn. ins. l.j.") and not ("elder l.j.") and not ("fed.
comm. l.j.") and not ("urb. l.j.") and not ("urban l.j.") and not ("women's l.j.") and not ("rights l.j.") and
not ("rts. l.j.") and not ("rits. l.j.") and not ("immigr. l.j.") and not ("immigration l.j.") and not
("gaming l.j.") and not ("emp. l.j.") and not ("empl. l.j.") and not ("bus. com. l.j.") and not ("tax l.j.")
and not ("sports l.j.") and not ("mar. l.j.") and not ("maritime l.j.") and not ("con. l.j.") and not ("black
l.j.") and not ("dev. l.j.") and not ("resol. l.j.") and not ("quinnipiac health l.j.") and not ("quinnipiac
prob. l.j.") and not ("quinnipiac probate l.j.") and not ("hofstra labor l.j.") and not ("conn. prob. l.j.")
and not ("detroit l.j.") and not ("conn. probate l.j.") and not ("interdisc. l.j.") and not ("interdis. l.j.")
and not ("interdisciplinary l.j.") and not ("transp. l.j.") and not ("trans. l.j.") and not ("commercial
l.j.") and not ("asian am. l.j.") and not ("asian l.j.") and not ("actec l.j.") and not ("tch. l.j.") and not
("reserve l.j.") and not ("indian l.j.") and not ("computer l.j.") and not ("drug l.j.") and not ("cosm. l.j.")
and not ("raza l.j.") and not ("ohio s. l.j.") and not ("dame l.j.") and not ("loy. l.j.") and not
("southwestern l.j.") and not ("u. chicago l.j.") and not ("mich. l.j.") and not ("will. l.j.") and not ("geor.
l.j.") and not ("harvard l.j.") and not ("wis. internat. l.j.") and not ("tex. internat. l.j.") and not ("envt'l
l.j.") and not ("o.s. l.j.") and not ("tul. l.j.") and not ("fordham internat. l.j.") and not ("ethnic anc. l.j.")
and not ("software l.j.") and not (s.w. l.j.") and not ("sw. l.j.") and not ("comp. l.j.") and not ("u.s.-mex.
l.j.") and not ("poverty l.j.") and not ("phoenix l.j.") and not ("ariz. l.j.") and not ("tran. l.j.") and not
("admin. l.j.") and not ("technology l.j.") and not ("transnat'l l.j.") and not ("indus. rel. l.j.") and not
("industrial relations l.j.") and not ("ind. rel. l.j.") and not ("trade l.j.") and not ("n.y.l.j.") and not
("comm. reports") and not ("law review commission") and not ("law rev. comm") and not ("law rev.
commn") and not ("law rev. com.") and not ("tax law rev.") and not ("law review") and not ("law
journal") and not ("l.rev.") and not ("law rev.") and not ("j.l.") and not ("l. jour.") and not ("jour. l.")
and not ("journal of law") and not ("l.q.") and not ("pol'y") and not ("j. envtl.") and not ("j. pub.") and
not ("j. int'l l.") and not ("j. corp. l.") and not ("j. crim. l.") and not ("j. const. l.") and not("int'l comp.
l.") and not ("j. fam. l.") and not ("notre dame law.").
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exception of a small handful with only one citation over the course of 1945-2018 that
could not be included in the search string due to Lexis Advance's character limit.
Next, since I excluded various commercial or other non-academic publications such
as New York Law Journal or Administrative Law Review, from my initial searches
using Lexis Advance’s and not function, I then ran searches for these journals
independently and added back those opinions that also cited to academic
journals. 135
Additionally, after discovering that many courts used the abbreviations "l.r." for
"law review" or "law j." for "law journal," I ran separate searches for opinions citing
academic law journals using those abbreviations while also crafting my search to
exclude false positives and prevent double-counting opinions already included in
previous searches to the greatest extent possible. 136

This was accomplished by searching for ("admin. l. rev.") & DA (aft 12-31-1944), then using Lexis'
"Search within" feature to highlight the terms "l. rev. OR "j.l." OR "l.j." Once the terms were
highlighted in my results list, I could sort by "Reported" under "Publication Status," sort by date,
then tally any results that also cited to academic legal periodicals.
136 My "L.R." Search: "univ. l.r." OR "u. l.r." OR "harv. l.r." OR "harvard l.r." OR "harvard lr" OR
"harv lr" OR "colum. l.r" OR "columbia l.r." OR "columb. l.r." OR "columbia lr" OR "stan. l.r." OR
"stanford l.r." OR "cornell l.r." OR "cornell lr" OR "chi. l.r." OR "chicago l.r." OR "chi lr" OR "rts. l.r."
OR "akron l.r." OR "ala. l.r." OR "alabama l.r." OR "alaska l.r." OR "alb. l.r." OR "albany l.r." OR
"am. crim. l.r." OR "am. u. l.r." OR "ariz. l.r." OR "arizona l.r." OR "ark. l.r." OR "baylor l.r." OR
"brooklyn l.r." OR "buff. l.r." OR "buffalo l.r." OR "buff. crim. l.r." OR "cardozo l.r." OR "w. res. l.r."
OR "western res. l.r." OR "chicago-kent l.r." OR "cath. l.r." OR "chi-kent l.r." OR "clev. st. l.r." OR
"cleve. st. l.r." OR "conn. l.r." OR "col. l.r." OR "c.r.-c.l. l.r." OR "creighton l.r." OR "cumberland l.r."
OR "dakota l.r." OR "depaul l.r." OR "dick. l.r." OR "dickinson l.r." OR "drake l.r." OR "drexel l.r."
OR "duq. l.r." OR "duquesne l.r." OR "fordham l.r." OR "ind. comm. l.r." OR "ga. l.r." OR "wash. l.r."
OR "gonzaga l.r." OR "houston l.r." OR "hous. l.r." OR "new eng. l.r." OR "bus. l.r." OR "tech. l.r." OR
"hofstra l.r." OR "idaho l.r." OR "iowa l.r." OR "kan. l.r." OR "kansas city l.r." OR "la. l.r." OR "loy.
l.r." OR "loyola l.r." OR "l.a. l.r." OR "marq. l.r." OR "marquette l.r." OR "mercer l.r." OR "md. l.r."
OR "mich. l.r." OR "michigan l.r." OR "minn. l.r." OR "minnesota l.r." OR "mo. l.r." OR "mont. l.r."
OR "mtn. l.r." OR "neb. l.r." OR "n.c. l.r." OR "n.m. l.r." OR "n. ky. l.r." OR "nova l.r." OR
"northwestern l.r." OR "dame l.r." OR "nyu lr" OR "pepp. l.r." OR "pepperdine l.r." OR "rutgers l.r."
OR "john's l.r." OR "diego l.r." OR "clara l.r." OR "seton hall l.r." OR "smu l.r." OR "s. tex. l.r." OR
"cal. l.r." OR "johns l.r." OR "louis l.r." OR "suffolk l.r." OR "syracuse l.r." OR "tax l.r." OR "cooley
l.r." OR "marshall l.r." OR "tul. l.r." OR "tulane l.r." OR "ucla l.r." OR "u.c.l.a. l.r." OR "balt. l.r." OR
"u.c. davis l.r." OR "u.m.k.c. l.r." OR "umkc l.r." OR "cin. l.r." OR "cincinnati l.r." OR "u. colo. l.r." OR
"dayton l.r." OR "water l.r." OR "mercy l.r." OR "fla. l.r." OR "ill. l.r." OR "miami l.r." OR "okla. l.r."
OR "pa. l.r." OR "penn. l.r." OR "pitt. l.r." OR "pittsburgh l.r." OR "rich. l.r." OR "tenn. l.r." OR "tex.
l.r." OR "tol. l.r." OR "toledo l.r." OR "tulsa l.r." OR "utah l.r." OR "vand. l.r." OR "vanderbilt l.r." OR
"vand lr" OR "vill. l.r." OR "villanova l.r." OR "va. l.r." OR "forest l.r." OR "wash. lee l.r." OR "va lr"
OR "washington l.r." OR "wayne l.r." OR "wayne lr" OR "western l.r." OR "wm. mary l.r." OR "wm.
mitchell l.r." OR "wis. l.r." OR "wyo. l.r." & DA (aft 12-31-1944) and not ("l.j.") and not ("j.l.") and not
("l. jour.") and not ("jour. l.") and not ("l. rev.") and not ("law review") and not ("law journal") and not
("journal of law") and not ("d. ala. l.r.") and not ("d. alaska l.r.") and not ("dist. alaska l.r.") and not
("l.r. co.") and not ("d. pa. l.r.") and not ("pa. l.r.b.") and not ("pa. l.r. bd") and not ("d. va. l.r.") and
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not ("d. w.va. l.r.") and not ("va. l.r. civ.") and not ("va. l.r.n.s.") and not ("d. wash. l.r.") and not ("d.
wis. l.r.") and not ("d. ariz. l.r.") and not ("d. cal. l.r.") and not ("dist. cal. l.r.") and not ("d. ill. l.r.")
and not ("d. minn. l.r.") and not ("d. md. l.r.") and not ("d. mich. l.r.") and not ("d. tex. l.r.") and not
("d. mo. l.r.") and not ("d. iowa") and not ("dist. iowa") and not ("l.r. co.") and not ("iowa l.r.a.") and
not ("d. neb. l.r.") and not ("d. mont. l.r.") and not ("d. la. l.r.") and not ("d. n.c. l.r.") and not ("d. fla.
l.r.") and not ("d. okla. l.r.") and not ("d. tenn. l.r.") and not ("d. ga. l.r.") and not ("buffalo l.r. ry.")
and not ('buffalo l.r.r.") and not ("district of michigan l.r.") and not ("d. conn. l.r.") and not ("d. idaho
l.r.") and not ("dist. idaho") and not ("d. kan. l.r.") and not ("l.r. hannen, burlington") and not ("hatch
v. cincinnati") and not ("pittsburgh l.r. rd.") and not ("utah l.r.b.") and not ("utah l.r. board") and not
("utah l.r. gardiner") and not ("d. n.m. l.r.") and not ("ass'n m.l.r.b.") and not ("n.m.l.r. civ. 7.1") and
not ("d. va. lr") and not ("va lr civ.") and not ("d. wyo. l.r.") and not ("arizona l.r. civ.") and not
("arizona l.r.b.p.") and not ("dakota l.r. foy") and not ("dakota l.r. 1.3") and not ("gray nova l.r.'s
mother") and not ("on the bus l.r. testified") and not ("22 cal. l.r.").
This was my "Law J." search string: ("yale law j." OR "georgetown law j." OR "hastings law j." OR
"duke law j." OR "alb. law j." OR "albany law j." OR "cornell law j." OR "emory law j." OR "ind. law
j." OR "indiana law j." OR "rutgers law j." OR "widener law j." OR "geo. law j." OR "n.c. cent. law j."
OR "miss. law j." OR "ill. law j." OR "tex. law j." OR "texas law j." OR "ky. law j." OR "hast. law j."
OR "tech. law j." OR "depaul bus. law j." OR "berkeley bus. law j." OR "hastings bus. law j." OR "duq.
bus. law j." OR "rutgers bus. law j." OR "entrepen. bus. law j." OR "davis bus. law j." OR "vand. law
j." OR "u.p.r. bus. law j." OR "rico bus. law j." OR "nevada law j." OR "chi. law j." OR "kentucky law
j." OR "mary's law j." OR "marys law j." OR "ohio law j." OR "nev. law j." OR "denver law j." OR
"brandeis law j." OR "basin law j." OR "hall law j." OR "st. thomas law j." OR ("hamline law j.") OR
("willamette law j.") OR "little rock law j." OR "ualr law j." OR "washburn law j." OR "wash. law j."
OR "u. ark. law j." OR "hasting law j." OR "tulsa law j." OR "wyoming law j." OR "blackletter law j."
OR "coastal law j." OR "wyo. law j." OR "nova law j." OR "denv. law j." OR "den. law j." OR "louis
law j." OR "howard law j." OR "how. law j." OR "cam. law j." OR "camden law j." OR "u.a.l.r. law j."
OR "marshall law j." OR "state law j." OR "u. law j." OR "univ. law j." OR "university law j." OR "det.
law j." OR "envtl. law j." OR "envt. law j." OR "env. law j." OR "environmental law j." OR "st. law j."
OR "const. law j." OR "constitutional law j." OR "world law j." OR "admin. law j. am." OR "pac. law
j." OR "pacific law j." OR "sci. law j." OR "law j. sci." OR "md. law j." OR "int'l law j." OR "intl. law
j." OR "international law j." OR "interest law j." OR "int. law j." OR "hofstra lab. law j." OR "hofstra
labor law j." OR "comp. lab. law j." OR "comporative labor law. j." OR "educ. law j." OR "education
law j." OR "prop. law j." OR "property law j." OR "can.-u.s. law j." OR "ent. law j." OR "entertainment
law j." OR "conn. ins. law j." OR "elder law j." OR "fed. comm. law j." OR "urb. law j." OR "urban law
j." OR "women's law j." OR "rights law j." OR "rts. law j." OR "rits. law j." OR "immigr. law j." OR
"immigration law j." OR "gaming law j." OR "emp. law j." OR "empl. law j." OR "employment law j."
OR "bus. com. law j." OR "tax law j." OR "sports law j." OR "mar. law j." OR "maritime law j." OR
"con. law j." OR "black law j." OR "dev. law j." OR "resol. law j." OR "quinnipiac health law j." OR
"quinnipiac probate law j." OR "quinnipiac probate law j." OR "conn. prob. law j." OR "detroit law j."
OR "conn. probate law j." OR "interdisc. law j." OR "interdis. law j." OR "interdisciplinary law j." OR
"transp. law j." OR "trans. law j." OR "commercial law j." OR "asian am. law j." OR "asian law j." OR
"actec law j." OR "tch. law j." OR "reserve law j." OR "indian law j." OR "computer law j." OR "drug
law j." OR "cosm. law j." OR "raza law j." OR "ohio state law j." OR "dame law j." OR "loy. law j." OR
"southwestern law j." OR "u. chicago law j." OR "mich. law j." OR "will. law j." OR "geor. l.j." OR
"harvard law j." OR "envt'l law j." OR "tul. law j." OR "tulane law j." OR "ethnic anc. law j." OR
"software law j." OR "s.w. law j." OR "southwestern law j." OR "comp. law j." OR "comparative law j."
OR "u.s.-mex. law j." OR "poverty law j." OR "phoenix law j." OR "ariz. law j." OR "transportation law
j." OR "admin. l.j." OR "administrative law j." OR "technology law j." OR "transnat'l law j." OR
"transnational law j." OR "indus. rel. law j." OR "industrial relations law j." OR "ind. rel. law j." OR
"trade law j.") & DA (aft 12-31-1944 & bef 01-01-2019) and not ("n.y.l.j.") and not ("comm. reports")
and not ("law review commission") and not ("law rev. comm") and not ("law rev. commn") and not

Finally, I crafted searches for citations to all academic journals excluded from my
previous searches attempting to exclude opinions citing to those journals that were

("law rev. com.") and not ("tax law rev.") and not ("law review") and not ("law journal") and not
("l.rev.") and not ("law rev.") and not ("j.l.") and not ("l. jour.") and not ("jour. l.") and not ("journal of
law") and not ("l.q.") and not ("pol'y") and not ("j. envtl.") and not ("j. pub.") and not ("j. int'l l.") and
not ("j. corp. l.") and not ("j. crim. l.") and not ("j. const. l.") and not("int'l comp. l.") and not ("j. fam.
l.") and not ("notre dame law.").

already included in my previous totals. 137 I then scanned these results to ensure no
false positives were included. 138
The search string for citations excluded from my initial "L.R." query: ("az. l.r." OR "int'l l.r." OR
"pennsylvania l.r." OR "gate l.r." OR "puget sound l.r." OR "u. of hawaii l.r." OR "wesleyan l.r." OR "l.
sch. l.r." OR "n.c. cent. l.r." OR "univ. ill. l.r." OR "seattle l.r." OR "u. of ill. l.r." OR "touro l.r." OR
"miss. c.l.r." OR "gonz. l.r." OR "vanderbilt lr" OR "geo. mason l.r." OR "u.s.f. l.r." OR "coll. l.r." OR
"evtl. aff. l.r." OR "int'l comp. l.r" OR "mary's l.r." OR "liberties l.r." OR "willamette l.r." OR "widener
l.r." OR "whittier l.r." OR "washburn l.r." OR "southwestern l.r." OR "richmond l.r." OR "u.s.f. l.r."
OR "francisco l.r." OR "samford l.r." OR "denver l.r." OR "u.d.c. l.r." OR "f.s.u. l.r." OR "ohio state l.r."
OR "cal. davis l.r." OR "valpo l.r." OR "valparaiso l.r." OR "william mary l.r." OR "northern l.r." OR
"cleveland state l.r." OR "ucd l.r." OR "uc davis l.r." OR "amer. crim. l.r." OR "new crim. l.r." OR
"boston college l.r." OR "stetson l.r." OR "byu l.r." OR "cal. w. l.r." OR "cath. l.r." OR "mex. l.r." OR
"louisiana l.r." OR "kansas l.r." OR "or. l.r." OR "n.d. l.r." OR "s.c. l.r." OR "me. l.r." OR "nebraska
l.r." OR "vt. l.r." OR "oklahoma l.r." OR "oregon l.r." OR "virginia l.r." OR "carolina l.r." OR "car. l.r."
OR "baltimore l.r." OR "s.w. l.r." OR "s.d. l.r.") & DA (aft 12-31-1944 & bef 01-01-2019) and not
("l.r.s.") and not ("l.r.a.") and not ("l.r. bd.") and not ("n.s.w.l.r.") and not ("d. kansas l.r.") and not
("dist. of new mex. l.r.") and not ("d. new mex. l.r.") and not ("d. louisiana l.r.") and not ("d.
pennsylvania l.r.") and not ("pennsylvania l.r. board") and not ("pennsylvania l.r.b.") and not ("d.
s.d.") and not ("d. vt.") and not ("district of nebraska") and not ("me. l.r.b.") and not ("d. me.") and not
("d. az. l.r.") and not ("d. s.c.") and not ("d. n.d. l.r.") and not ("n.y.n.d. l.r.") and not ("d. or.") and not
("l.j.") and not ("comm. reports") and not ("law review commission") and not ("law rev. comm") and
not ("law rev. commn") and not ("law rev. com.") and not ("tax law rev.") and not ("law review") and
not ("law journal") and not ("l.rev.") and not ("law rev.") and not ("j.l.") and not ("l. jour.") and not
("jour. l.") and not ("journal of law") and not ("l.q.") and not ("pol'y") and not ("j. envtl.") and not ("j.
pub.") and not ("j. int'l l.") and not ("j. corp. l.") and not ("j. crim. l.") and not ("j. const. l.") and
not("int'l comp. l.") and not ("j. fam. l.") and not ("notre dame law.").
My final excluded citations search string: ("va. l. weekly" OR "cal. reg. l. rep." OR "intel. prop. rev."
OR "j.c.l. c.r." OR "j. envt'l admin. l." OR "j. global trade" OR "nat. l. f." OR "pitt. tax rev." OR "ind.
legal f." OR " j. afr.-am. l." OR "rich. j. global l." OR "civ. l. f." OR "j. sci. tech. envtl. l." OR "intell.
prop. j." OR "j. envtl. pub. health l." OR "inst. on mineral" OR "j. prac. clinical l." OR "rev. ent. sports
l." OR "j. int'l media" OR "j. food l." OR "j. health hosp. l." OR "j.l. soc'y" OR "mary pol'y rev." OR
"juris rev." OR "l. bus. rev. am." OR "j. int'l arb." OR "j. pub. int'l l." OR "j. tax l." OR "j. asian l." OR
"j. equine" OR "j. chinese l." OR "j. racial ethnic" OR "j. on legal malpractice" OR "j. comp. corp. l."
OR "rev. int'l l." OR "major tax plan." OR "pub. int. l. rep." OR "j.c.r. econ." OR "world pub. ord." OR
"int'l l.f." OR "ind. l.f." OR "loyola l.j." OR "depaul l.j." OR "camd. l.j." OR "southwest l.j." OR "so. tx.
l.j." OR "suffolk t. l.j." OR "hasings l.j." OR "adm. l.j." OR "intenatl l.j." OR "williamette l.j." OR "ann.
surv. mass. l." OR "dakota bar briefs" OR "chi.-kent rev." OR "contemporary law pamphlets" OR
"denver law center journal" OR "denv. l. ctr. j." OR "hastings con." OR "hastings constitutional law
quarterly" OR "j. radio l." OR "natural law forum" OR "nat. res. j." OR "iowa law bulletin" OR
"nebraska law bulletin" OR "s. car. l.q." OR "int'l l. forum" OR "l. sch. record" OR "ill. l.q.")& DA (aft
12-31-1944 & bef 01-01-2019) and not("law review") and not("law journal") and not("l.rev.") and
not("law rev.") and not ("j.l.") and not("l. jour.") and not("jour. l.") and not("journal of law") and
not("n.y.l.j.") and not("pol'y") and not("j. envtl.") and not("j. pub.") and not("j. int'l l.") and not("j. corp.
l.") and not("j. crim. l.") and not("j. const. l.") and not("int'l comp. l.") and not("j. fam. l.") and
not("notre dame law.") and not ("yale l.j.") and not ("georgetown l.j.") and not ("hastings l.j.") and not
("duke l.j.") and not ("alb. l.j.") and not ("albany l.j.") and not ("cornell l.j.") and not ("emory l.j.") and
not ("ind. l.j.") and not ("indiana l.j.") and not ("rutgers l.j.") and not ("widener l.j.") and not ("geo.
l.j.") and not ("n.c. cent. l.j.") and not ("miss. l.j.") and not ("ill. l.j.") and not ("tex. l.j.") and not ("texas
l.j.") and not ("ky. l.j.") and not ("hast. l.j.") and not ("tech.l.j.") and not ("depaul bus.") and not
("berkeley bus. l.j.") and not ("hastings bus. l.j.") and not ("duq. bus. l.j.") and not ("rutgers bus. l.j.")
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I believe these searches were as comprehensive as possible, but due to potential
citation discrepancies in the opinions and potential human error, including every
citation over the period studied is impossible. That being said, I am confident that
the results are as accurate as possible, despite these limitations.
In terms of compiling my results, since my data represents opinions citing journals
rather than total citations, multiple citations in an opinion were not counted.
Therefore, if an opinion cited more than one journal in Part I or if an opinion cited a
particular journal title more than once, or multiple journal titles within the same
group in Part II, the additional citations were not added to the total. I also did not
differentiate between majority opinions, dissents or concurrences, nor did I account
for a negative or critical citation of an article. Essentially, if my searches indicated a
reference to an academic legal periodical anywhere in an opinion, it was added to
my total.
I also did not account for differences in page numbers per volume for the different
journal titles, which provides an advantage to more voluminous or more regularly
published journals as they produce more material that could potentially be cited by
a court. 139 Other scholars have attempted to account for this advantage by
and not ("entrepen. bus. l.j.") and not ("davis bus. l.j.") and not ("vand. l.j.") and not ("u.p.r. bus. l.j.")
and not ("rico bus. l.j.") and not ("nevada l.j.") and not ("chi. l.j.") and not ("kentucky l.j.") and not
("mary's l.j.") and not ("marys l.j.") and not ("ohio l.j.") and not ("nev. l.j.") and not ("denver l.j.") and
not ("brandeis l.j.") and not ("basin l.j.") and not ("hall l.j.") and not ("thomas l.j.") and not ("hamline
l.j.") and not ("willamette l.j.") and not ("rock l.j.") and not ("ualr l.j.") and not ("washburn l.j.") and
not ("wash. l.j.") and not ("u. ark. l.j.") and not ("hasting l.j.") and not ("tulsa l.j.") and not ("wyoming
l.j.") and not ("blackletter l.j.") and not ("coastal l.j.") and not ("wyo. l.j.") and not ("nova l.j.") and not
("denv. l.j.") and not ("den. l.j.") and not ("louis l.j.") and not ("howard l.j.") and not ("how. l.j.") and
not ("cam. l.j.") and not ("camden l.j.") and not ("u.a.l.r. l.j.") and not ("marshall l.j.") and not ("state
l.j.") and not ("u. l.j.") and not ("univ. l.j.") and not ("det. l.j.") and not ("envtl. l.j.") and not ("envt. l.j.")
and not ("env. l.j.") and not ("st. l.j.") and not ("const. l.j.") and not ("world l.j.") and not ("admin l.j.
am.") and not ("pac. l.j.") and not ("pacific l.j.") and not ("sci. l.j.") and not ("l.j. sci.") and not ("y.l.j.")
and not ("md. l.j.") and not ("int'l l.j.") and not ("intl. l.j.") and not ("international l.j.") and not
("interest l.j.") and not ("int. l.j.") and not ("hofstra lab. l.j.") and not ("comp. lab. l.j.") and not ("educ.
l.j.") and not ("prop. l.j.") and not ("can.-u.s. l.j.") and not ("ent. l.j.") and not ("entertainment l.j.") and
not ("conn. ins. l.j.") and not ("elder l.j.") and not ("fed. comm. l.j.") and not ("urb. l.j.") and not
("urban l.j.") and not ("women's l.j.") and not ("rights l.j.") and not ("rts. l.j.") and not ("rits. l.j.") and
not ("immigr. l.j.") and not ("immigration l.j.") and not ("gaming l.j.") and not ("emp. l.j.") and not
("empl. l.j.") and not ("bus. com. l.j.") and not ("tax l.j.") and not ("sports l.j.") and not ("mar. l.j.") and
not ("maritime l.j.") and not ("con. l.j.") and not ("black l.j.") and not ("dev. l.j.") and not ("resol. l.j.")
and not ("quinnipiac health l.j.") and not ("quinnipiac prob. l.j.") and not ("quinnipiac probate l.j.")
and not ("hofstra labor l.j.") and not ("conn. prob. l.j.") and not ("detroit l.j.") and not ("conn. probate
l.j.") and not ("interdisc. l.j.").
138 Some academic legal periodicals used such common names they had to be excluded from my
results, for example, a search for the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform's previous title,
Prospectus, returns over 5,000 opinions unrelated to the journal.
139 See Olavi Maru, Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 227, 240–
41 (1976) ("Other things being equal, a journal with more citable material may be expected to be
cited more often than one with less citable material.").

measuring citations per article, 140 citations per page, 141 and even citations per
word. 142 Given, however, that my study looked at judicial citations to all academic
law journals as well as citations to groupings of law reviews rather than particular
volumes or years, these options were not practical, nor would they have added
measurably to my analysis. 143

Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 389, 392 (2000).
Leonard, supra note 90, at 193–94.
142 Perry, supra note 73, at 10.
143 Id. at 10–11 ("Total citations are the best measure of the overall influence of each journal . . . The
journal that publishes more text is more valuable in the sense that it contributes more to the legal
discourse . . . As long as impact per se is a valid measure of quality (in the aggregate sense), citation
frequency is a legitimate ranking criterion. On the other hand, using standardized citation rates
(such as citations per x words, or even citations per article) better reflects average academic
quality.").
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